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ABSTRACT
Eight years after Congress passed Superfund legislation in
1980 to address our nation's most hazardous waste sites, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has "cleaned up" only about
a dozen of 951 sites currently on the National Priority List. In
the 1986 Superfund amendments, Congress mandated goals for the
initiation of site cleanups. To accomplish this task, Congress
gave EPA authority to offer incentives to potentially responsible
parties (PRPs) to have them conduct, or at least pay for, the
cleanup of sites. By having PRPs conduct cleanup, Congress
believes that more sites will be cleaned up in less time.
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) can assist EPA
negotiators to overcome settlement obstacles so that more PRP
settlements occur. Through the use of neutrals (i.e.,
facilitators, mediators, and arbitrators), PRPs shape the outcome
of agreements and, in so doing, will comply by them more often
than if imposed by EPA or the courts. By including state and
citizen representatives in actual negotiations and having neutral
assistance, EPA can reduce legal and political challenges and
gain support for its cleanup efforts. ADR is also a better
process than traditional dispute resolution because it extends
the criteria for a "successful" cleanup from tangible interests
(i.e., lower transaction costs and quicker cleanups) to
intangible interests (i.e., future relationships and satisfaction
with the process and outcome).
Even though high-level EPA officials advocate using ADR in
settlement negotiations, Regional staff have not followed the
lead. One recommendation to overcome obstacles to ADR at EPA is
step-by-step protocols that give specific advice to EPA Regional
Superfund staff on how to incorporate ADR into the enforcement
process. Regional officials will be more likely to use ADR to
assist them in negotiations once they understand it and feel that
it will help them reach their goals.
The thesis supervisor was Professor Lawrence E. Susskind.
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INTRODUCTION
Orange liquids ooze from abandoned landfills into nearby
brooks. Huge rusting oil drums lie scattered about in overgrown
fields. In open pits, rich black fluids vaporize on hot
afternoons. Meanwhile, nearby residents suffer headaches,
nausea, long-term illness, birth defects, and even death from
exposure to these hazardous wastes.
To address the cleanup of contaminated sites, Congress
passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), better known as "Superfund."
CERCLA authorizes the federal government to respond to releases
of hazardous substances. To accomplish this, Congress
established a $1.6-billion trust fund financed by a tax on crude
oil and certain raw chemicals. In 1986, Congress replenished the
Superfund by continuing the crude oil and chemical tax and
supplementing it with an excise tax and hazardous waste
management tax. The new provisions, set forth in the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), will generate
$8.1-billion.
There are currently 951 hazardous waste sites listed on the
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) National Priority List
(NPL). EPA expects this number to eventually reach 2,000. The
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) estimates that 10,000 or
more sites may ultimately require cleanup (OTA 1985).
While the United States is spending billions of dollars to
clean up toxic waste dumps, EPA has cleaned up only about 12 NPL
sites since CERCLA was enacted in 1980. Dissatisfied with the
slow pace of the cleanup effort, Congress mandated in SARA that
EPA try harder to convince potentially responsible parties
(PRPs) 1 to conduct and finance cleanups voluntarily. Congress
believes that more cleanups will occur at a faster pace if the
PRPs do more of the work themselves.
EPA's current cleanup strategy is to use Fund money and seek
reimbursement during a later cost recovery phase whenever PRP
settlements are not quickly negotiated. However, EPA cannot do
this in every case because the Fund is limited. Therefore, PRP
settlements are necessary to avoid draining the Fund. As PRPs
assume site cleanup responsibility, Fund resources are released
for other sites.
While EPA has made some progress in expediting cleanups, the
1987 cleanup rate is inadequate when compared to the SARA mandate
that EPA initiate 275 remedial investigations and feasibility
studies (RI/FSs) and 175 remedial actions (RAs) by October of
1989.2 While EPA may make its deadline for initiating RI/FSs, it
needs the PRPs to perform or finance additional RAs to meet its
1 PRPs are generally regarded as site owners and operators
and waste generators and transporters. EPA negotiates
more often with generators whose numbers at one site
alone may reach several thousand.
2 RI/FSs are studies that assess the nature of site
contamination and rank cleanup alternatives. RAs, on the
other hand, involve the actual cleanup operations.
remedial action goals (Lucero 1988).
The House Appropriations Committee, which oversees EPA's
management of the Superfund program, recently criticized the
Agency for relying too heavily on the Superfund to finance
cleanups and being too lax in compelling PRPs to fund and manage
cleanup actions (HMIR 1988). As of September 30, 1987, over 70
percent of NPL sites that had undergone or were undergoing an
RI/FS (remedial investigation/feasibility study) or RD (remedial
design) were fully financed by Superfund, while about 55 percent
of the RAs (remedial actions) were Fund-financed. PRP
settlements (either full or partial PRP funding) were reached in
only about 27% of the RI/FSs and RDs and about 43% of the RAs
(HMIR 1988). EPA's task is to increase the number of PRP
settlements.
EPA needs the PRPs to agree to cleanup sites or pay for
cleanup. However, EPA will not get them to do so unless it
provides more incentives. Under current procedures, each side
doesn't always feel comfortable enough to divulge information to
the other. Inevitably, interests are hidden, making settlement
unlikely. EPA, therefore, needs to try some other methods to
foster agreements.
I advocate the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
as a means to increase the number of voluntary cleanups at
Superfund sites. Through the use of neutrals (i.e.,
facilitators, mediators, and arbitrators), each party has someone
in which to confide. By learning of each side's interests,
neutrals are in a much better position to offer settlement
packages that meet each side's concerns.
By using neutrals, PRPs are able to shape the outcomes of
agreements more readily than through unassisted negotiations. By
participating more fully in negotiations, PRPs are more likely to
accept the settlement terms and abide by them. In addition,
including state and citizen representatives in negotiations can
reduce legal and political challenges and increase support in
cleaning up sites.
Many obstacles to settlement are symptoms of each party
distrusting the others' scientific and technical information.
Neutrals are needed to devise joint fact-finding so that the
information is perceived as unbiased. Whereas information
presented in traditional forums seek only to determine whose
information is more convincing, jointly determined data aim to
solve the problems or narrow differences.
Other obstacles to settlement are caused by unorganized PRPs
during the early stages of negotiation. Neutrals can assist PRPs
to allocate cleanup responsibilities among themselves so they can
meet earlier with EPA to negotiate cleanup terms. During
negotiations, PRPs will feel more comfortable divulging
confidential information to neutrals than to EPA officials. A
neutral can then use this information to create settlement
packages that each party is likely to accept.
ADR offers a more democratic process than traditional
dispute resolution (i.e., traditional negotiation and litigation)
by enabling more parties to participate in cleanup decisions. In
addition, ADR offers a better process than traditional means
because it extends the criteria for a "successful" cleanup from
just tangible criteria (i.e., faster settlement, lower cost) to
intangible criteria (i.e., future relationships and satisfaction
with the process and outcome).
I begin by outlining the process by which EPA and the PRPs
negotiate settlements. After describing obstacles to settlement
and the various ways ADR may be used, I discuss what EPA
Headquarters can do to overcome the barriers to using ADR in the
Regions. In particular, I offer a detailed approach to using ADR
at a Superfund site through step-by-step protocols. Such a
document will be required to incorporate ADR into the existing
Superfund enforcement process. By following these steps, EPA
should be able to achieve its desired goals of increasing PRP
settlements while minimizing cost and delay.
The protocols represent two interwoven parts: (1) a basic
framework reflecting EPA's current Superfund enforcement
strategy; and (2) recommendations for supplementing or changing
this framework to increase the likelihood of settlement.
My primary audience is EPA staff in the Regions and Headquarters
involved in the Superfund enforcement effort. Although EPA
Headquarters has endorsed ADR, Regional staff are not certain how
or whether to implement it. Once Regional staff understand
exactly how ADR and other settlement strategies can be applied
within the general EPA enforcement framework, I believe they will
be accepted and used more readily. Furthermore, I believe that
if ADR is used appropriately, the number of PRP settlements will
increase and more sites will be cleaned up.
This thesis also covers other ADR applications that, if
implemented, would increase the efficiency of EPA in other areas
besides Superfund. It will take time for these new concepts to
permeate the bureaucracy. Headquarters should employ an array of
strategies to attract the attention of employees at different
levels of the Agency. A major challenge facing Headquarters is
to engage Regional staff to join them in using ADR and other
settlement techniques to increase the efficiency of the Agency,
while expanding the notion of what is a "successful" cleanup.
Chapter 1: SUPERFUND ENFORCEMENT PROCESS
The Superfund enforcement process is the legal framework in
which EPA staff negotiate settlements. In this chapter, I
summarize the enforcement process and describe which EPA staff
negotiate with the PRPs. I then present the legal pressure
points, or "enforcement actions," that EPA uses to compel PRPs to
settle. This chapter also explains the options available to the
Agency if it cannot reach a settlement. In addition, I describe
how a site becomes an "enforcement-lead" (or a site where
enforcement staff take charge); which Agency manages the cleanup;
and who pays for cleanup. There is no single EPA document that
describes all these aspects of the Superfund enforcement process.
The following information was gleaned from numerous EPA policy
documents.
EPA Superfund Staff Functions
All Superfund cleanup efforts must follow the basic
guidelines set forth in the National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) [40 CFR 300] and CERCLA (as
amended). According to these guidelines, EPA Superfund personnel
perform three major functions: Enforcement, Site Management, and
Community Relations (See Figure 1).
Regional enforcement staff include those in the Office of
Regional Counsel (ORC) and those responsible for Technical
Enforcement Support. Enforcement staff are most closely involved
in PRP settlement negotiations. Site Management is orchestrated
FIGURE 1: EPA Superfund Staff Functions
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by the Regional Project Manager (RPM) in the Regional Waste
Management Division. The Community Relations Coordinator (CRC)
in the Office of Public Affairs handles public relations. These
staff work closely together during all phases of site cleanup.
My focus is on enforcement. Site Management and Community
Relations are discussed only as they relate to settlement
negotiations.
Summary of the Superfund Enforcement Process
The Superfund enforcement process includes two "components"
that mirror the two ways in which EPA responds to releases or
threatened releases of hazardous substances: Removal Action to
reduce a site's immediate threat to human health and environment
and Remedial Action to conduct a more permanent cleanup (see
Figure 2). All National Priorities List (NPL) sites undergo
remedial action, but not all sites undergo removals. Even though
Removals occur before Remedial Action at most sites, my focus is
on the more general circumstances surrounding Remedial Action.
Whereas there are two major negotiation stages in Remedial Action
(RI/FS and RD/RA), there usually is only one opportunity to
negotiate in Removals (see Figure 2).
Remedial Action can be broken into five phases: (1) Initial
Remedial Response; (2) PRP Remedial Investigation/Feasibility
Study (RI/FS); (3) Record of Decision (ROD); (4) Remedial
Design/Remedial Action (RD/RA); and (5) Operations and
Maintenance. Figure 2 shows how the five phases of Remedial
Action fit with the overall flow of enforcement activities.
FIGURE 2
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Adapted From PRP SEARCH MANUAL, August 1987, OSWER Dir. 9834.6
The five Remedial Action phases can be further divided into
specific enforcement tasks. Initial Remedial Response covers
enforcement activities from preparation for negotiation through
its conclusion. Before EPA places a site on the NPL, enforcement
activity usually is confined to Preliminary and Baseline PRP
Searches. After the NPL listing, EPA sends General Notice
Letters to PRPs to open informal negotiations and later sends
RI/FS Special Notice Letters to trigger a formal negotiations
process for the RI/FS. If EPA locates PRPs who are willing to
cooperate, the next phase is the RI/FS Negotiation. If EPA does
not settle with PRPs, or if settlement includes less than 100
percent of the RI/FS costs from PRPs, EPA will bring enforcement
action (see next page) against non-settlers.
Assuming that negotiations are successful and a settlement
is reached, private parties conduct the PRP RI/FS. About this
time, EPA sends RD/RA Special Notice Letters to PRPs to trigger
another formal negotiations period, this time for actual cleanup.
With the RI/FS process complete, EPA issues its Record of
Decision (ROD) to announce the chosen cleanup strategy.3 EPA
initiates an RD/RA Negotiation to get PRPs to either pay for or
implement the cleanup. Again, if the PRPs and EPA do not settle,
EPA will take enforcement action against non-settlers, if
resources permit.
If negotiations succeed, private parties conduct both the
3 EPA Region I, however, announces the ROD before sending
RD/RA Special Notice Letters because they believe that
PRPs are more willing to negotiate once EPA chooses the
cleanup strategy.
Remedial Design (RD) and Remedial Action (RA). After the PRP or
other "Lead Agency" (State or EPA) conducts the response, EPA
enters the Cost Recovery phase to recoup Fund money used on
activities for which PRPs are responsible. The enforcement
process concludes with Operations and Maintenance which sets
terms and conditions for continued site monitoring and NPL
deletion.
During Removal Actions (COMPONENT 2), enforcement staff
usually assume a limited role as site managers mobilize rapidly
in response to immediate threats. However, if a Preliminary PRP
Search identifies parties, expedited PRP Notification and Removal
Negotiation phases occur prior to Removal. Otherwise, EPA does
the work and seeks reimbursement during Cost Recovery.
Superfund Enforcement Actions
CERCLA gives EPA several legal methods for compelling PRPs
to assume responsibility for hazardous waste cleanup. These
legal remedies can be either administrative, as in the case of
Administrative Orders, or judicial - through Department of
Justice (DOJ) Referrals (See Figure 3).
Under Section 106, EPA can issue an Administrative Order to
compel a responsible party to clean up a site where there may be
an "imminent and substantial threat to human health or the
environment.". An administrative order summarizes the terms of a
cleanup agreement, including sampling requirements, cleanup
techniques, and timetables. EPA usually first attempts to
negotiate the administrative order with the responsible party.
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER
Unilateral Consent
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Sec. 106 Recovery
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If EPA chooses to negotiate and is successful, the agreement is
bound in a consent order. However, if negotiations fail, EPA
can develop a unilateral administrative order or use the Fund for
cleanup. EPA issues these orders as demands which PRPs are
legally obligated to obey. If violated, these orders may be
enforced by the courts (Superfund: A Six Year Perspective, Oct.
1986, OSWER). However, due to resource limitations, EPA cannot
always pursue non-settlers through litigation.
There are times when EPA may want initially to issue a
unilateral administrative order, such as for removals when quick
action is needed to address immediate threats. However, in
general, EPA does not favor the use of unilateral orders because
if PRPs do not comply, EPA must litigate and involve the DOJ. To
litigate, EPA must prove that the site presents an "imminent and
substantial endangerment." These factors complicate action
because they are resource-intensive and take exclusive control
away from EPA. EPA would rather negotiate with PRPs or use the
Fund to pay for cleanup.
EPA can also refer a case for judicial action. EPA,
through a DOJ Referral, may ask a Federal district court to
compel private party cleanup under Section 106 of CERCLA or
private party cost recovery under Section 107. The court may
also agree to issue a consent decree (the result of successful
negotiations between EPA and the responsible parties).
SARA requires that consent decrees be issued for all RD/RA
agreements; a consent decree may provide for long-term EPA
oversight of a cleanup action managed by the responsible party
(Superfund: A Six Year Perspective). Under a consent decree, the
Attorney General must approve the agreement, after which it must
be entered in federal district court (ERT 1987). However, EPA has
a choice whether to bind RI/FS agreements in consent orders or
consent decrees.
EPA favors consent orders because it maintains exclusive
control over the settlement negotiations; consent decrees require
DOJ involvement. Also, consent orders for RI/FSs do not require
a finding of "imminent and substantial endangerment," a proof
necessary under consent decrees.
Lead Agency Determination and Cleanup Funding Mechanisms
After EPA lists a site on the NPL, it designates the site
either as Enforcement-lead or Fund-lead (see Figure 4) depending
upon: (1) the existence of financially sound responsible parties;
(2) the strength of the enforcement case; (3) the likelihood of
constructive negotiations; (4) the time available before the
response must begin; and (5) the availability of Fund resources
(Anderson 1985). Fund-leads are undertaken at sites with little
prospect for successful or timely enforcement action. EPA
prefers an enforcement-lead when financially-viable PRPs clearly
exist and the government's case is strong.
EPA allocates Fund money only to a limited number of NPL
sites during its Superfund Comprehensive Accomplishments Plan
(SCAP) planning process. The SCAP is an EPA management plan
which identifies site- and activity-specific Superfund financial
allocations for each quarter of the current fiscal year (OSWER -
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"PRP Participation in Remedial Investigation and Feasibility
Studies"). Whereas Fund-lead sites are backed by Superfund
money, enforcement-lead sites do not have access to Fund
resources if negotiations fail. Only in cases where EPA
negotiates a settlement at Fund-lead sites will Fund money be
released for enforcement-leads that don't settle. Due to the
resource-intensiveness of litigation, EPA cannot always litigate
unsettled enforcement-leads, causing substantial delay in the
cleanup process.
The purpose of enforcement actions is either to get PRPs to
take the lead in site cleanup or have them pay for cleanup
conducted by the State, EPA, or another federal agency. The
Agency's willingness to conduct Fund-financed cleanup and seek
reimbursement through enforcement actions is an important tool
for achieving negotiated settlements. Court backing of EPA
enforcement actions also contributes to the readiness of PRPs to
negotiate. Enforcement-lead actions can result in three
different lead entities that take control of the cleanup: PRPs,
EPA (or another federal agency), or the state (see Figure 4).
A PRP-lead is the result of an Administrative Order or DOJ
Referral that compels private party response. If PRPs agree to
conduct cleanup, they must follow conditions set forth in the EPA
guidance "PRP Participation in Remedial Investigation and
Feasibility Study". PRPs can take the lead if they agree to pay
the costs of conducting the response action. However EPA has
recently implemented a SARA-approved "mixed funding" arrangement
whereby both private and Fund resources are used as a condition
of settlement. In addition, if PRPs are to conduct the response,
they must agree to pay the costs of EPA's oversight of PRP work
to assure the quality of work performed and that work is done
according to law and to EPA policy.
Although EPA's primary goal is to have the PRPs conduct the
cleanup, it may also settle if the PRPs agree to finance a
cleanup conducted by EPA or the state. In either case, the PRPs
may finance either all response costs or partial costs in a mixed
funding arrangement. When EPA takes the lead, EPA site managers
supervise the cleanup while the Agency hires its own contractors.
For Superfund cleanups, CERCLA requires a state to assume:
(1) the future operations and maintenance of removal and remedial
actions at a site; (2) the availability of an off-site waste
disposal facility; and (3) payment of 10% of all remedial actions
or at least 50% of all remedial actions if the state or its
political subdivision ever operated' the facility at which
hazardous waste was disposed.
A State-lead takes place if the State and EPA negotiate a
Cooperative Agreement. Conditions for Cooperative Agreements
(CAs) are found in EPA document "Interim Guidance on State
Participation in Pre-Remedial and Remedial Response" (OSWER
9375.1-09). These agreements can be funded in a variety of ways.
If CAs arise from enforcement action, responsible parties (RPs)
will contribute at least partial costs with the Fund and state
resources covering the remainder. In this case, EPA plays an
* Before SARA, the requirement was ownership of land and
not operation of a facility.
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oversight role during the cleanup process.
EPA also has the option to operate under a Fund-lead and use
Superfund money to cleanup a site and recover costs later from
RPs. This option is taken either right after a site gets on the
NPL, during the SCAP planning process, or after unsuccessful
negotiations during enforcement action. Fund-leads are fully
funded by the Superfund, as the Agency takes the lead by hiring
its own contractors and relying on cost recovery actions to
replenish the Fund. In Fund-leads where the State and EPA form a
Cooperative Agreement, the State takes the lead. In these cases,
federal money is transferred to the State but EPA oversees the
cleanup process.
Chapter 2: SETTLEMENT OBSTACLES AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
The 1986 amendments to CERCLA require that EPA change the
ways in which it negotiates and reaches Superfund settlements.
Whereas some of these changes favor settlement (i.e., by offering
to use the Fund to supplement PRP costs for site cleanup), others
may make reaching settlement more difficult by limiting EPA's
discretion to make decisions (i.e., by providing detailed
guidance on cleanup standards and methods to achieve them). The
amendments also call for the inclusion of more parties,5
particularly the states and members of the public, in cleanup
decisions (Endispute EIAR). Whether or not EPA offers incentives
to PRPs to negotiate, there are significant obstacles to
achieving negotiated settlements.
In Chapter 1, I described the process by which PRPs and EPA
negotiate. This chapter explains what can go wrong during these
negotiations. I have based this chapter on the framework
contained in an EPA report by Endispute, Inc. [yet to be released
by EPA] entitled, "Negotiating Better Superfund Settlements:
Lessons from Experience and Recommendations for the Future" *
5 Typically, the key site negotiators are the PRPs' lawyers
and EPA representatives (the Remedial Project Manager and a
lawyer from the Office of Regional Counsel). In addition, the
Department of Justice is involved in cases referred for judicial
action.
* EPA's Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation (OPPE)
commissioned Endispute, Inc., a consulting firm in Washington,
D.C., to identify and analyze factors impeding successful
negotiations and make recommendations for more productive
settlements. The purpose of Endispute's study was to provide
recommendations to EPA on what it could do better, recognizing
that all other parties could also change their behavior in
16
Endispute's format provides a logical way to organize the many
settlement obstacles that occur repeatedly throughout the
enforcement process.
The Endispute report suggests reasons for cleanup delay;
identifies conflicts between negotiating parties; and discusses
ways in which professional neutrals (i.e., facilitators,
mediators, and arbitrators) can help produce better 7 negotiated
settlements. Endispute identifies five areas in which obstacles
to settlement can occur; their recommendations regarding each
area focus on EPA's need to create better Superfund settlements
to achieve a greater number of cleanups in a shorter time and at
less cost:
(1) Participation - consider involving all affected parties
early in settlement negotiations;
(2) Information Sharing and Development - expand information
sharing and pursue joint data collection and analysis;
significant ways so as to create better settlements.
The data for Endispute's report come from interviews with
representatives from EPA, PRPs, and the Department of Justice at
twenty-five sites. Site agreements were bound in the following
ways: 16 consent orders (64 percent); seven consent decrees (28
percent); one cost recovery agreement (4 percent); and one
consent agreement (4 percent). The remedies agreed to during the
negotiations involved eight removal actions (32 percent); fifteen
RI/FSs (60 percent); eight RD/RAs (32 percent); and five cost
recovery actions (20 percent). Often more than one remedy was
agreed upon for a single site. Approximately half of the
settlements involved multiple PRPs (Endispute EIAR).
7 Defined by the authors of the Endispute study (Lawrence
Susskind and Jonathan Marks) as ones which:
* Are more efficient - with lowered transaction costs;
* Do not leave joint gains on the table;
* Are perceived by the participants as more legitimate;
* Yield stronger and more realistic commitments from all
participants and thus are more likely to be
implemented;
* Satisfy more of the interests of the participants.
(3) Flexibility - adopt more flexible and innovative
approaches to decision-making;
(4) Allocation - provide both a direct and indirect role to
assist PRPs in reaching allocation agreements; and
(5) Dispute Resolution - develop site-specific guidelines
for the use of ADR in Superfund negotiations and train
government negotiators in ADR techniques.
This chapter describes how ADR can be used to overcome
settlement obstacles in these five broadly defined areas. To do
this, I apply ADR theory to the actual Superfund enforcement
process. I begin by describing how traditional methods of
dispute resolution (i.e., negotiation and litigation) have
produced barriers to settlement and introduce ADR as a way to
assist negotiators. I then discuss how neutrals can help EPA
include more parties in cleanup decisions; share information and
jointly develop data; allow greater Agency flexibility in
decision-making; and allocate cleanup costs more fairly.
Whereas this chapter discusses obstacles to settlement,
Chapter 3 focuses on overcoming the barriers to ADR at EPA and
gives recommendations to Headquarters on how they can get
Regional officials to use ADR. Through the use of protocols that
apply ADR concepts at each step in the Superfund enforcement
process, I conclude by explaining to Regional enforcement staff
exactly how to use ADR.
Figure 5 illustrates the relationship between chapters. I
separate the discussion into two chapters because the Agency
needs to address barriers to ADR as a distinct problem.
Endispute's report, on the other hand, does not separate ADR from
the other settlement barriers. Distinguishing the barriers to
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using ADR will provide the topic with attention commensurate with
its potential importance in producing more and better
settlements.
Traditional Dispute Resolution
EPA responded to the CERCLA amendments by offering greater
settlement incentives to PRPs. However, this does not mean that
agreement is easy to reach. Disagreements often arise over
complex legal, scientific, technical, and procedural issues.
When conflicts arise between EPA and other parties, the Agency's
traditional approaches to dispute resolution are often
inadequate. Failure to resolve these disputes can unnecessarily
delay or prevent settlement.
An internal EPA memorandum ("Settlement of Enforcement
Actions Using Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques") cited
such obstacles to negotiations as a large number of defendants
who find it difficult to organize themselves; personality
conflicts between negotiators; inflexible negotiating postures;
and the technical complexity and scientific uncertainty plaguing
many cases. Additional obstacles inherent in the litigation
process cause further delays and frustrations. These include:
"lengthy and complicated discovery procedures; the failure of
judges to quickly rule on motions or to schedule hearings; and
the intense effort which must be made to educate the trier of
fact on both legal and technical issues (p.2)."
Since current dispute resolution procedures have been
inadequate to resolve most conflicts in a timely manner, new
mechanisms are needed. As a supplement to traditional
enforcement methods, ADR should be incorporated in settlement
negotiations. Not only can ADR resolve disputes unsolved by
traditional means, but it also offers a process by which to
prevent conflicts from arising.
ADR can address many of the obstacles that develop through
traditional means of negotiation and litigation. For example,
EPA should use a facilitator to identify and organize the large
numbers of PRPs at many sites. EPA's current strategy - to let
PRPs organize themselves - has created delay in the negotiations
process. PRPs do not have the skills or information required to
organize. By having neutrals organize PRPs and help them
allocate their cleanup responsibilities, the PRPs will be able to
approach EPA earlier in the process with settlement offers. EPA,
therefore, will have more time to negotiate with PRPs. In fact,
with a neutral, there is no reason for EPA to wait for an offer
from PRPs. They can begin negotiating and jointly developing
data as soon as each side is willing.
Personality conflicts can stall any negotiation. Attacks by
one party usually are met by defensiveness and attacks by the
other. During unassisted negotiations, these personal affronts
take the focus away from an agreement and cause alienation.
Neutrals are especially helpful in holding each party to agreed
upon groundrules that prohibit personal attacks and negative
language. While each party will agree that this type of behavior
is counter-productive, a neutral "referee" almost always is
needed to hold the parties to their commitment. By avoiding
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attacks, the neutral focuses the discussion on getting an
agreement. Also, by providing encouragement to the negotiators,
neutrals can often keep disparate parties talking long enough to
resolve key issues blocking settlement.
Superfund is characterized by complex scientific and
technical information. Not only is it difficult to establish
which chemicals exist at each site and who is responsible, but
the health effects associated with each chemical often is
scientifically unproven. During current negotiation procedures,
EPA and PRPs use consultants to perform costly studies that
support their own positions instead of finding solutions to a
joint problem. This often results in an unresolved dispute that
may end up in court.
Judges are ill-equipped to understand the detailed technical
and scientific issues of Superfund. They rule on which side is
more convincing instead of basing a ruling on the data. Even if
the judge rules in EPA's favor, a PRP is less likely to abide by
a decision that it thinks is unfair or not based on the facts.
Neutrals can play fact-finding roles to get the parties to agree
on known information and help them establish procedures to
jointly develop additional data. By agreeing on the assumptions
by which data are obtained, the PRPs are more likely to commit to
the terms of any negotiated agreement based on these data.
The same holds for scientific disputes that do not enter the
courts but are handled administratively. Resources are not used
efficiently if each side independently develops data. There
invariably will be arguments about the assumptions that led to
the results. Joint fact-finding allows the parties to assemble
and begin discussions before each side has "all the facts."
Therefore, they can save time and resources by developing one set
of data that each party agrees upon.
Judicial obstacles are also created by judges being slow to
rule on motions or to schedule hearings. This delay is often
associated with a crowded court schedule or complicated formal
procedures. ADR is a more informal process that is flexible
enough to forego some of the time-consuming and unnecessary court
proceedings. Parties don't have to wait months or years to
present their side of the story. Instead, neutrals are readily
available to begin hearing each side's story as soon as the
parties are willing to talk.
EPA should expand its current efforts to encourage the use
of professional neutrals as well as other processes that may or
may not require assistance from a neutral (joint fact-finding and
mini-trials) [See the Appendix for a Summary of ADR Methods].
All ADR methods leave total control over the process and outcome
to the negotiators. The one exception to this rule is binding
arbitration. However, as with all ADR procedures, binding
arbitration must be agreed upon in advance by all participants.
In all the other ADR methods, outside parties do not impose
decisions.
ADR techniques are intended to produce the same, or better,
outcomes as those that the Agency would probably reach through
litigation and negotiation. Current EPA strategy, however, is
confrontational. Either the PRPs abide by what EPA wants or the
Agency uses the Fund for cleanup. This inflexible negotiating
posture often results in no settlement. By fostering cooperation
and consensus, ADR offers a more constructive atmosphere for
negotiations. ADR focuses on collaborative problem-solving as a
way to satisfy the interests of all parties likely to be affected
by the cleanup decision. By letting PRPs know that it wants to
reach a negotiated settlement, EPA will be more likely to get
one.
Contrary to popular belief among EPA staff, ADR should not
diminish the role or importance of enforcement. It does,
however, use litigation only as a means to bring uncooperative
parties to the table and not as a way to force willing parties to
settle. Negotiations proceed along much the same lines using
ADR, except that negotiators are assisted by a neutral party who
has no interest in the outcome.
Mediation, one ADR method, offers a way for negotiators to
express their underlying interests behind stated positions. Once
other negotiators hear these interests, they are in a better
position to offer ways to satisfy them. Also, by maintaining
confidentiality and neutrality through separate meetings,
mediators can help the parties reach more creative solutions. In
contrast, traditional methods of dispute resolution entrench
parties firmly in their positions and create adversarial
relationships. that stifle problem-solving.
Neutrals nurture future working relationships by making it
part of the criteria for a "successful" outcome. Neutrals aim to
make participants satisfied with not only the outcome of
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negotiations but also the process. In so doing, neutrals attend
to participants' emotions as needs to be satisfied (i.e., fear of
health effects from site contamination). By satisfying these
emotional needs, parties will be better able to focus on
solutions. Although ADR is not an alternative to the Superfund
enforcement process, it is, however, a process that produces
alternative relationships.
Other ADR methods are process-oriented. Facilitators, for
instance, can provide logistical support by managing the process
of negotiations. In current negotiations, these logistics are
accomplished either hastily or not at all. Many negotiations
break down due to lack of adequate administrative support.
Neutrals are needed to assume these responsibilities because
negotiators' time is better spent on the content of the
settlement.
In the following sections, I show how using professional
neutrals and other ADR methods can overcome obstacles to
settlement in four of the areas outlined by Endispute. I expand
upon key Endispute recommendations by giving examples of how
neutrals can change the nature of the negotiations process.
Participation
Data from Endispute's study indicate that "increasing the
number of participants in Superfund negotiations is likely to
lengthen the time required to reach an initial agreement...
However, it may be possible to complete a cleanup more quickly if
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the interests of all concerned parties are considered during
appropriate stages of the negotiations (Endispute EIAR)." ADR is
a process to include more parties in negotiations. Not only is
this consistent with the CERCLA amendments, but ADR is also more
democratic in that it gives decision-making power to those likely
to be affected by the decision. In so doing, ADR expands the
notion of what should be considered a "successful" settlement.
While capable of decreasing overall transaction costs and time
before cleanup, ADR also adds fairness as a criteria for
settlement.
EPA officials are well aware of the limitations they place
on participation. However, they claim that resource and time
constraints make it impossible to include more participants in
negotiations. Due to these constraints, EPA negotiators limit
the participation of parties during negotiations to only those
PRPs with "deep pockets" (or those able to fund most or all the
cleanup). EPA officials exclude other interested parties, namely
state and local officials and the public, mainly because they
believe that negotiations would be overly complex and lengthy.
For example, one EPA official (Leighton 1988) believes that local
citizens are incapable of negotiating with EPA and the PRPs
because they lack technical sophistication' and sometimes use
public meetings as platforms for their campaigns.
Endispute's data suggest that EPA's exclusionary, short-
term, and efficiency-oriented strategy may be ineffective over
8 SARA addressed this issue by providing citizens at each
site with the opportunity to obtain $50,000 to hire technical
consultants.
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the long term (Endispute EIAR). If EPA excludes "peripheral"
parties from negotiations, the Agency may find it more difficult
to reach settlement and conduct site cleanup. For example, PRPs
may sue non-settling PRPs; citizens and environmental groups may
wage legal and political challenges in response to EPA's chosen
cleanup strategy; and states may be slow in helping EPA obtain
access to property. Excluding parties may also deprive
negotiations of vital site information. In addition, and most
importantly, such an exclusionary strategy may make PRPs who
would normally settle unwilling to negotiate because they
perceive the negotiations process as unfair.
Despite the inefficiency and delay that increased
participation may appear to create, EPA should include all
legitimately interested parties as active participants in the
negotiations process. At each major phase of negotiation, EPA
should consider which parties - identifiable PRPs, state and
local agencies, and citizen and environmental groups - should be
actively involved and how those interests can best be represented
(Endispute-EPA).
Professional neutrals can make it easier for EPA to manage
increased participation. Neutrals can identify key parties;
convince them to negotiate by espousing the benefits of
settlement; help them sell the agreement to their constituencies;
and administer meeting groundrules agreed upon by the group.
Their involvement will increase the chance of settlement between
EPA and the PRPs.
Mediators are adept at addressing power imbalances (such as
the lack of technical abilities) so that all parties can
participate. For example, SARA provides citizens at each
Superfund site with the chance to obtain $50,000 to hire
technical consultants. Mediators can make sure the community
receives this money in time to review documents and keep up with
the rapid negotiations pace. While not aiming to equalize power,
mediation can give each party the opportunity for meaningful
input to the decision.
It is important for all legitimately interested parties to
participate because if excluded, they can cause delays in
reaching settlement. For example, an environmental group
excluded from negotiations may wage a legal challenge over
cleanup standards. However, if that party were included in
negotiations and its interests satisfied, it is less likely they
will cause delays through legal suits. Just as with the PRPs, if
parties other than EPA helped shape the cleanup strategy, they
would have a stake in its being successfully implemented.
Due to the wide range of interests that need to be satisfied
at a site, unassisted negotiations often will be unorganized and
too complex for resolution. Neutrals are needed in these
circumstances to coordinate the parties. By being outside the
dispute, the neutral is in a position to explain how settlement
can benefit each party. EPA would be far less convincing if it
had to tell each party how it would benefit by settling with the
Agency. This is synonymous with industry telling EPA that it is
better for the Agency if the corporations do their own monitoring
and report to the Agency only if they exceed pollution standards.
EPA should consider neutral assistance to identify and
include key interests in negotiations. Neutrals are often able
to convince parties that negotiations can be beneficial even if
they don't initially appear to be. Mediators are trained to
listen to the interests of both sides and make suggestions for
trade-offs on issues. Often one issue that is important for one
party may be valued less by the other. For example, EPA might
agree to do an expanded PRP search if identified PRPs agree to
conduct an immediate removal action. In such a case it is
possible for the agreement to produce a "win-win" situation where
both sides are better off after settlement.
The "Final Report on the Airlie Superfund Conference"'
concluded that the overriding obstacle to settlement is the
growing perception among PRPs that the Superfund process
currently contains too few incentives to settle. PRPs who
cooperate with EPA believe they face higher overall costs than
other PRPs (Quarles). Although EPA would like the PRPs to
conduct more cleanups, many believe that non-settlers get a
better deal. PRPs claim that once they settle, EPA lacks
aggressive enforcement against recalcitrant parties and
compromises with non-settlers during cost recovery. Instead of
conducting up-front negotiations, PRPs often would rather EPA use
9 This report was written by John Quarles, December 15,
1987. The Airlie Superfund Conference, sponsored by the EPA
Superfund Settlements Project, was held in Warrenton, Virginia on
October 20-22, 1987. The conference was attended by leading
representatives of government and industry, including top
officials of the EPA and the Department of Justice, as well as
participants from Congressional staff and environmental
organizations. The purpose of the conference was to examine
problems obstructing settlements.
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the Fund for cleanup and seek to achieve a settlement during a
cost recovery suit.
By producing settlement incentives and disincentives, EPA
should attempt to involve every possible PRP in the settlement
process. Mediators can help the parties discuss settlement
incentives that are consistent with statutory constraints, such
as using the Fund for a percentage of cleanup if agreement is
reached within a specified period of time. In addition,
mediators can help to structure cleanups in phases so PRPs can
commit to shorter-term agreements where the responsibilities are
more finite.
To make PRPs more willing to settle, EPA could agree to make
it more costly to be a non-settler. Through the help of a
mediator, responsible parties (RPs) and EPA could write a
specific agreement (bound as a consent order) in which EPA would
aid settlers in locating recalcitrant parties so that the RPs
would be more likely to recover cleanup costs.
Neutrals can increase citizen participation by assisting EPA
in developing community relations plans that include facilitated
dialogues with the site community. They can also help EPA
identify at which sites key community representatives should be
present for negotiations and what procedures would guide their
involvement. In addition, mediators can increase state
participation in cleanup by forging a financial and resource-
sharing arrangement between EPA and state officials.
CERCLA amendments still only require that EPA give the
community an opportunity to "review and comment" on the proposed
cleanup strategy. However, this approach does not account for
the benefits of more active citizen participation. Including key
community representatives with adequate technical expertise would
add a new dimension to the negotiations. Currently, the public's
concerns for protection of health and the environment are
represented by EPA during negotiations. However, I don't think
that EPA actually can represent the public on these issues
because it is also accountable to other interests. EPA
therefore, finds itself advocating environmental interests that
would be better represented by the public.
Including community representatives in actual negotiations
will balance the cost-minimizing behavior of the PRPs because
they will always want the most protective (costly) cleanup. If
these groups faced each other under current negotiation
procedures, there likely would be unproductive shouting matches.
With the help of a mediator to manage discussions, EPA could play
a more moderate role "in the middle" by taking a position between
the PRPs and the community. Such a change in negotiation
dynamics could increase the likelihood of settlement.
Since SARA does not obligate EPA to negotiate with the
community or state and local governments, these other parties are
rarely included. Therefore, these next few sections discuss ways
that ADR can assist EPA and the PRPs to overcome additional
barriers to settlement.
Information Sharing and Development
Whenever EPA determines that a formal period of negotiation
would facilitate an agreement, it sends Special Notice Letters to
PRPs. SARA requires that EPA provide noticed parties with the
names and addresses of all PRPs; the volume and nature of
substances contributed by each PRP; and a ranking by volume of
substances at the facility (CSI-Allocation, 1987).
Additional site-specific information needed to conduct
negotiations and cleanup a site include: names of waste
contributors; waste volumes and toxicity; hydrogeologic
conditions; and potential health impacts of the waste.
Disagreements over the accuracy, validity, and completeness of
data are major barriers to negotiating successful settlements
(Endispute-EPA). In addition, experts hired by each side to win
the information battles tend to delay solutions and fail to
resolve technical issues. While not all information can be
shared by the parties,1* Endispute concluded that sharing more
information in a timely fashion and fostering collaborative
gathering and analysis of information can produce better
settlements.
PRPs who attended the Airlie Superfund Conference said that
it is often difficult for them to present a timely and meaningful
settlement offer if EPA does not give them information early
10 For example, if EPA has little evidence, it may not want
to reveal its poor negotiating position to PRPs (Silverman 1988).
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enough in the process." Superfund negotiation procedures afford
PRPs only 60 days after receiving RI/FS Special Notice Letters to
present a "good faith" offer to EPA. PRPs want EPA to supply
them with enough information so they can draw other PRPs into the
settlement process. In fact, PRPs need this data to organize
their steering committee to negotiate with EPA. EPA officials,
however, rarely have time and resources to conduct a thorough PRP
search to supply the vital information; instead, they want the
PRPs to assist them in gathering data rather than waiting for the
Government to do all the work (Quarles). Since EPA usually has
poor information, it is motivated to limit negotiations and use
the Fund for cleanup (Leighton 1988).
Even though EPA shares information with PRPs, it needs to go
further. EPA and PRPs rely on one another for information.
However, there are many times when each side waits for the other,
resulting in delays and mutual frustration. In addition, data
developed independently by one side is often viewed with
suspicion. EPA should help PRPs obtain the data they need to
form a steering committee and to identify other PRPs for
inclusion in negotiations. PRPs could then negotiate more
effectively with the Agency and make "good faith offers" earlier
in the process. Joint data-gathering and analysis not only
provides crucial information to all parties but inspires trust
21 Recent EPA policy (OSWER - "Interim Guidance on Notice
Letters, Negotiations, and Information Exchange," October 19,
1987) does request that staff provide PRPs with "waste-in" data
and "PRP lists" as early in the process as possible. In
addition, EPA guidance encourages the Regions to issue General
Notice Letters well in advance of the Special Notice to give PRPs
more time to present a "good faith offer."
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and confidence among the parties by focusing on a common problem.
Neutrals can assist the parties in a number of ways. Most
importantly, they help parties realize that "joint gains" are
possible through agreement to share information and develop data
jointly. Mediators can help EPA and the PRPs agree on which
information is needed for negotiations and can create data bases
for both known information and that which needs to be developed.
Mediators can also foster agreements to use a jointly-selected
independent fact-finder who will work with the group to develop a
methodology and conditions to fill data gaps. For example, EPA
and PRPs might choose to hire a professor from a reputable
university to report on the toxicity of various chemicals at the
site.
"Data Mediation" can also assist the parties in resolving or
narrowing disagreements over the interpretation of data
(Endispute-EPA). In addition, mediators can organize information
exchange and help establish the validity of data. Mediators can
also focus the parties on sharing resources to obtain the data
and help them understand the repercussions of not reaching
agreement.
Flexibility
EPA Headquarters encourages Regional staff to use their own
discretion in decision-making and to be flexible in settlement
negotiations. For example, staff are told to consider "mixed
funding arrangements, "de minimis" settlements, and other
incentives (explained later) to induce settlement. However,
EPA's need to be consistent often can result in inflexibility
where overall Agency goals are sacrificed at the expense of rigid
adherence to policy.
Owing to a lack of guidance regarding acceptable trade-offs,
EPA negotiators often maintain rigid negotiating postures. This
inflexibility is also the result of inexperienced staff who face
older more experienced PRP negotiators. Due to insecurity about
their abilities, these staff "go strictly by the book." They
tend to confuse legal power with negotiating power and create
unrealistic expectations about what is required for settlement.
EPA's inflexible negotiating style has been a major obstacle to
settlement and has instilled distrust among PRPs.
ADR offers a process that incorporates the law as boundaries
for an agreement and not as a constraint on issues for
discussion. Neutral assistance can unlock key settlement
obstacles by helping the Agency and PRPs adopt more flexible
approaches to certain key "procedural" and "substantive"
negotiation issues.12
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES REQUIRING FLEXIBILITY
A number of recent EPA policies have made it acceptable for
Regional staff to be more flexible in substantive issues.1 " Even
12 Substantive issues are Superfund-specific and involve
actual issues (i.e., mixed funding and de minimis settlements) on
which EPA negotiates to reach settlement. These are usually
issues referred to as "PRP incentives." Procedural issues, on
the other hand, relate to how EPA negotiates and involves EPA's
management structure and its decision-making process.
13 See references for policies concerning mixed funding, de
minimis settlements, and covenants not to sue.
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though EPA has made progress in this area, the examples below
illustrate differences in opinion between EPA and PRPs on issues
that create significant settlement obstacles. The following four
issues were identified by the Airlie Conference participants as
their most major concerns. For each issue, I show how ADR can
help achieve faster and better settlements.
Role of PRPs in Selection of Cleanup Remedy
EPA makes all decisions regarding the type of site cleanup.
"The Agency negotiates with PRPs only after it chooses the
remedy; it doesn't negotiate the type of remedy (Leighton
1988)."t14 In addition, it only offers a limited opportunity for
public comment. Therefore, in cases where EPA performs the
RI/FS, the PRPs often have insufficient time to review and
comment on the Agency's choice of cleanup remedy (Airlie). EPA
also requires that an RI/FS be performed before any remedy is
selected, even in cases where enough information is known to
begin remedial work. Confining issues for negotiations and
limiting the time for review and comment can make PRPs less
likely to agree to perform cleanup. Using neutrals at this
critical stage to uncover interests and trade commitments can
help provide the flexibility needed to stay within Agency
guidelines and obtain settlement.
Even though the Agency has ultimate decision-making
14 Although EPA believes that it must retain ultimate
authority to select the remedy at each site, it is open to PRP
settlement proposals and PRP technical input in such complex
issues as risk assessment scenarios and cleanup technology
feasibility (Quarles).
authority, it should allow PRPs to negotiate over how cleanups
are achieved as long as overall Agency goals, such as cleanup
standards, are not compromised. PRPs will be more interested in
conducting a cleanup if they endorse the underlying strategy.
They will be less likely to settle if EPA imposes a strategy. In
addition, the PRPs will comply by a cleanup plan that they help
design. They will be more committed to a solution that partially
has their "stamp of approval."
Mediators can help the Agency establish its "bottom line"
for cleanup standards and work with other governmental agencies
to include "applicable or relevant and appropriate" 1 " state and
federal requirements. By establishing a bottom line, negotiators
will be more comfortable with accepting creative solutions that
fall within the acceptable range. Mediators can also focus the
negotiators on comprehensive goals. By concentrating on overall
cleanup goals rather than strictly adhering to policy, the Agency
is likely to get more PRP-conducted cleanups while obtaining the
desired levels of environmental quality and site safety.
Letting each party negotiate over the type of cleanup could
also solve the PRPs' problem of limited public comment on EPA's
chosen cleanup strategy. Using a neutral to identify key parties
to include in negotiations may make it unnecessary for these
parties to partake in the public comment period. Instead,
neutrals would help these key representatives "sell the
15 CERCLA amendments require that remedial actions comply
with "applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements (ARARs)
of federal laws and more stringent state laws (OSWER - "Interim
Guidance on Compliance with ARARs," July 9, 1987).
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agreement" to their constituencies.
EPA should involve PRPs and other parties early in
discussions of cleanup options. Early involvement will lead to
greater ownership of the remedy by the PRPs, which will increase
the chance of them conducting cleanup. Being part of a
consensual process by which the remedy is selected will make PRPs
more likely to defend the outcome. PRPs would then be more
committed to the cleanup and less likely to commit compliance
violations.
Mixed Funding
CERCLA authorizes the Agency to settle with PRPs even if
they don't contribute 100 percent of the work costs. "Mixed
funding" describes an arrangement in which the Agency and PRPs
each contribute toward the cleanup."' Although it is
Headquarters policy to enter into mixed funding settlements,
Regional staff often are not flexible or innovative enough to
enter into these arrangements. Mediation can provide PRPs and
EPA with a forum for determining a fair PRP contribution and the
amount of Fund money to be used for cleanup.
Mediators can be objective listeners to each party's
concerns in order to offer solutions that will satisfy both and
1* The term "mixed funding" actually is used to describe
three types of arrangements: (1) "Preauthorization," in which the
PRPs conduct the response action and the Agency preauthorizes a
claim against the Fund for a portion of the work; (2) "Cash-
outs," in which the PRPs pay for a portion of the costs up-front,
and the Agency conducts the response action; and (3) "Mixed
Work," in which the PRPs and the Agency each agree to conduct
discrete portions of the activity ("Evaluating Mixed Funding
Settlements Under CERCLA," OSWER 9834.9, October 20, 1987).
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maximize benefits. Mediators serve as "reality testers" by
questioning seemingly unrealistic requests. For example, asking
a party how it thinks the other side will respond to their
suggestion forces them to think about the reasonableness of their
position. In addition, mediators get parties to think about
their options if no agreement is reached before the opportunity
has passed. If these "alternatives to a negotiated agreement"
(Fisher and Ury 1981) are less attractive, settlement becomes a
more favorable option.
Mediators also help parties jointly establish objective
criteria on which to base a decision. For example, the parties
might agree that mixed funding will be based upon the total
amount of waste contributed by known PRPs; the cleanup costs
associated with these wastes; the likelihood of recovering money
from recalcitrant parties; and the availability of Fund
resources. Even if these criteria are not identical with EPA
policy, the Agency must consider bending the policy if doing so
will establish an agreement that covers the Agency's bottom line,
meets Agency goals, and complies by other environmental laws and
regulations. Accomplishing such a settlement in an unassisted
negotiation is extremely difficult, whereas a mediator can make
these settlements more likely.
EPA's reliance on the application of joint liability is
contrary to its interests to accept less than total cleanup
costs. Making one PRP pay for the entire cleanup regardless of
its waste contribution should only be used in rare cases, instead
of being the current preferred policy. The Agency needs to be
more flexible to accept mixed funding arrangements so that they
increase the number of PRP settlements. This involves a reduced
reliance on joint and several liability. Even though both EPA
and PRPs agree about the importance of mixed funding settlements,
they disagree over its use in the following three circumstances:
a) "Orphans Shares" and "Recalcitrants' Shares"
EPA does not approve of using mixed funding for orphans'
shares (where the PRP is financially insolvent or non-existent)
but will cover recalcitrants' shares if the Agency can recover
the money by later suing the non-settlers. Industry, on the
other hand, believes that mixed funding should be used in both
cases, and that EPA should aggressively pursue recalcitrants to
make them pay for both orphans' shares and their own.
b) Use of Mixed Funding for the RI/FS
EPA believes that the RI/FS is not an important enough phase
to merit the expense of negotiations for mixed funding. They
would rather perform the RI/FS with Fund money and get reimbursed
during cost recovery. However, PRPs believe that the RI/FS holds
the link to later remedial action settlement and advocate a
streamlined mixed funding settlement process.
c) Use of Mixed Funding in Cash-out Settlements
Due to resource limitations, EPA favors using mixed funding
when PRPs agree to perform some or all of the work over
settlements in which PRPs "cash-out" and EPA performs the work.
PRPs, however, want mixed funding used for cash-out settlements,
especially when none of the PRPs own or operate the site.
Although it is difficult to predict what solutions EPA and
PRPs would agree to under these three circumstances, ADR offers a
process by which these issues can be discussed in an environment
that favors settlement. Discussions over mixed funding
settlements are complex. During unassisted negotiations, it is
easy to develop old patterns of defensiveness and argumentation
over positions. When impasse is reached, neither side will want
to change its position or relax its demands.
A mediator can help parties keep to groundrules during
meetings to maintain a productive work environment. Also, a
mediator can be used to send signals of reconciliation to the
other side without that other side appearing to "give in." This
also helps the parties maintain a public position while privately
being able to make concessions.
Neutrals can also help EPA realize greater benefits to
accepting mixed funding settlements. For instance, a mediator
promote community acceptance of the agreement by assisting the
negotiators in writing a joint press release. Such a concept
would be difficult to execute without a neutral party sensitive
to each side's media concerns. A mediator can also probe the
PRPs for ways they can make the cleanup more permanent and
protective, thus satisfying a key EPA interest. Testing each
party's willingness to accept an agreement is more appropriate
for a person with no interest in the outcome. A neutral,
therefore, has more influence in asking each side to address the
other's most pressing concerns.
Mediation can also "expand the pie" so that additional
issues are included in negotiations, such as "past costs" or
"premium payments."1 7 In complex and heated negotiations,
participants are often too involved to be capable of thinking of
complicated trade-offs involving issues not part of the current
dispute. It is often hard enough for them to know what they
want. Additional issues are considered to complicate the
negotiations. A mediator, however, takes a more objective view
and listens for issues that can be included in the overall
agreement. By expanding the number of issues in negotiations, a
mediator can open up the parties to a new "package" that may
include acceptable trade-offs.
De Minimis Settlements
A de minimis waste contributor is a PRP who is liable for
cleanup but who has only minimally contributed (based on amount
and toxicity) to other hazardous substances at the facility (EPA
- "Interim Guidance on Settlements with De Minimis.."). EPA
promotes early settlement with de minimis contributors to avoid
future transaction costs of negotiating and litigating that could
turn out to be an amount greater than what the contributor would
be expected to pay. As in the case of mixed funding, however,
Regional negotiators are reluctant to settle with de minimis
contributors. EPA should encourage the PRPs to hire a mediator
17 EPA uses "Premium Payments" as a settlement incentive.
Premiums are paid by PRPs before work is completed and act as
insurance against future cost overruns. EPA will reward settlers
with lower premiums (i.e., 5% of the estimated cleanup costs) and
make recalcitrants pay higher amounts (i.e., 10% or 15%). In
addition, EPA uses "RI/FS Past Costs" as a part of settlement
negotiations. EPA can offer to include or omit past costs that
it has incurred as a result of prior response action (i.e.,
removal action) [Silverman 19881
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to arrange for de minimis settlements. If the PRPs can work out
an acceptable agreement among themselves, EPA should accept this
offer contingent upon the total contribution and which parties
assume future liability. EPA should negotiate with de minimis
parties only if private efforts fail.
De minimis settlements are an important way for EPA to make
negotiations more manageable by letting certain parties "buy out"
of their cleanup liability. De minimis settlements are
commensurate with a party's involvement at the site and dismiss
them from further liability. Since de minimis settlements shift
liability to either the remaining PRPs or the Fund, de minimis
parties should pay higher amounts "where the risks shifted are
greater and the shifting occurs earlier in the process (Quarles
p.13)." Since each site is different, flexibility is required to
fit the solution to the site-specific variables.
Mediation offers a forum to allow for these varied
solutions. For instance, a mediator can tailor an agreement to
meet the specific needs of each de minimis party. Those for whom
liability release is most important may want to pay more and
settle early in the negotiations process. Others who have fewer
assets may wish to retain the right to settle later and wait
until further information more clearly defines the extent of
their liability. Negotiators often try to get each other to
change positions which can cause personality conflicts and
impasse that threaten settlement. By focusing on interests,
mediators are able to satisfy what each party really needs to
establish settlement.
Mediation is also more capable than traditional processes of
including an outside expert to take part in joint fact-finding.
Both the PRPs and EPA have endorsed probability analysis as a way
to quantify the expected cost of the cleanup to compute de
minimis contributions. However, the Regions may lack the
resources necessary either to develop probability analyses or
review PRP-developed analyses. Mediators can easily bring a
statistical expert into negotiations who is jointly commissioned
to offer objective criteria on which to base an agreement.
Stipulated Penalties
"Stipulated penalties" are built into remedial action
settlement agreements so that if future compliance problems
occur, the penalties are already agreed upon. These penalties
usually take the form of escalated amounts. For instance, an
agreement may include a penalty of $1,000 per day for the first
15 days after a violation occurs and $2,500 for each day
thereafter (Silverman 1988). As part of compliance monitoring,
EPA imposes stipulated penalties on PRPs that do not comply by
the terms of an agreement. Unfortunately, stipulated penalties
create two kinds of obstacles - one is an obstacle to settlement,
the other an obstacle to compliance.
Stipulated penalties become a settlement obstacle when EPA
wants to set them higher than what PRPs will accept. Even though
EPA rarely enforces the penalties, it provides the Agency with an
appearance of strength. PRPs object to high stipulated penalties
because they don't feel they are always commensurate with the
violation. This tension during negotiations creates a poor
atmosphere for settlement.
As in other conflicts, neutrals can be an objective ear to
whether or not a penalty is reasonably related to the severity of
the violations. PRPs and EPA often disagree on what is a fair
penalty arrangement. These disputes tend to get emotional and
based on principle. In these circumstances, a mediator can help
the parties agree on objective criteria by which they can judge
for themselves whether their positions are reasonable. Mediators
can also work for agreement on capping penalty amounts so they
don't accrue continuously before EPA gives its notice of
violation to PRPs. In many such disputes, mediators help form
innovative agreements that later become the standard for similar
future situations.
Stipulated penalties also become a barrier to compliance
even though compliance is the goal sought. Disagreements often
arise over what constitutes a violation that will trigger the
penalty. In addition, miscommunication on both sides adds to
distrust between parties. For example, EPA will wait until after
the compliance date passes to slap on the violation and PRPs wait
until after EPA contacts them to raise objections.
Such conflicts point to the need for clearer written
agreements. Mediators are especially trained to avoid vague
language by clearly delineating each party's responsibilities for
specific tasks. Mediators can help the parties develop criteria
for a "violation." They can also press negotiators to include a
specific timeline that requires parties to contact each other
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before the compliance deadline has passed.
A good mediated agreement should attempt to avoid future
conflicts and include procedures in case they eventually do
occur. Unassisted negotiations sometimes complete agreements
that do not clarify responsibilities because their goal is "an
agreement at any cost." It is easier for them to say they
reached agreement and leave it to the next negotiator to work out
the disputes that arise due to unclear language. Mediators work
with the parties to make the settlement stable in the long-run.
These agreements can include remediation clauses if
disagreements should arise during the compliance monitoring
stage. This arrangement would be consistent with current EPA
policy to have a 30-day informal negotiation period before the
Agency will decide to either litigate or use the Fund and seek
cost recovery. Having a mediator on-call will make it more
likely that each side will come forward sooner to rectify the
perceived non-compliance or unfair judgement. In addition, EPA
officials will have a better chance of resolving the dispute
within the Agency instead of involving the DOJ or the courts in
the decision. This would enable the Agency to maintain greater
control over the outcome of the dispute.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES REQUIRING FLEXIBILITY
In addition to its policies on substantive flexibility, EPA
also has released recent guidance 1" that changes its management
1s For example, "Streamlining the CERCLA Settlement
Decision Process," February 12, 1987.
45
structure to respond more quickly to PRP settlement offers.
These policies now allow for greater Regional discretion to
accept PRP offers. Even so, PRP settlement offers often receive
delayed responses as Regional negotiators seek the views of
higher-level officials (Quarles). This delay often frustrates
PRP negotiators for whom timely cleanups are a reason to settle
because it would reduce their overall costs. To address this
obstacle, EPA should use a combination of neutrals and several
other innovative ideas designed to increase the pace of
negotiations.
Neutrals can assume the responsibility of walking a decision
through the bureaucracy. Currently, EPA negotiators don't have
time to follow the PRPs' offer as it travels through the Agency.
Delays and frustration often result. Although such a task may
appear trivial, it provides a means to hold participants
accountable and avoids delay and indecision. During the "waiting
periods," neutrals can defuse PRP frustrations by acting as a
liaison in expressing their concerns to EPA officials and
explaining to PRPs the Agency's decision-making process.
Neutrals can also suggest to the parties that appointing
negotiators with authority to settle, especially during the later
more critical phases of negotiations, will speed the process
considerably.
Mediators enable parties to clarify their interests and
decide on which issues they can be flexible. Meeting separately
with each party in advance helps parties better understand their
own interests and increases the efficiency of future
negotiations. At the bargaining table, mediators can decrease
the time needed for settlement by helping parties include issues
and accept packages that negotiators would have trouble devising
on their own.
One way to aid a mediator during negotiations is to design a
Hotline to Headquarters for Regional negotiators to call for
rapid response to PRP settlement offers (Endispute-EPA). Quick
guidance on site-specific variations will speed negotiations.
Establishing the Hotline at Headquarters will enable Regional
officials to be flexible enough to respond to individual
circumstances while also ensuring Regional consistency.
Another way to provide consistent policy is to communicate
settlement successes between Regions. One approach already
implemented by EPA is to develop a "computer-based inventory of
precedent" (Endispute-EPA) that focuses on possible solutions
rather than one right approach. Another way in which Regional
officials communicate their success is by monthly National Work
Group and Superfund Branch Chiefs Meetings that discuss recent
innovative settlements (Leighton 1988).
These innovative ideas for increasing EPA negotiators'
awareness about settlement options will make them more secure,
and therefore more creative, during settlement negotiations. To
further foster innovation, EPA must not only encourage, but
reward, those who negotiate innovative solutions. These
approaches, in combination with a mediator or other neutral, will
enhance the Agency's chances for settlement.
Allocation
Superfund settlements require that PRPs allocate costs and
responsibility among themselves for cleanups. For sites
involving multiple PRPs, EPA doesn't care how many contribute
toward payment as long as it receives enough to cleanup the site.
Under the court-backed joint and several liability ruling, EPA
can hold one party responsible for the entire cleanup regardless
of the quantity or toxicity of waste contributed. PRPs that
settle with EPA must therefore sue non-settling PRPs for cost
reimbursement. Since sites involving multiple PRPs require time
to coordinate and allocate costs, disputes among PRPs can delay
settlement with EPA. Neutrals can help PRPs organize themselves
and resolve allocation disputes so that timely negotiations can
proceed with the Agency.
Allocation is actually an appendaged stage of the Superfund
enforcement process. In contrast to the rest of the enforcement
process where EPA and PRPs negotiate, allocation mostly involves
negotiations only among PRPs. However, it can also include
negotiations between EPA and PRPs over mixed funding and de
minimis settlements.
There are two sets of allocation-related negotiations at
each of the two major phases of negotiation (RI/FS and RD/RA).
The first set involves intra-PRP negotiations over allocation
costs. In the second subsequent set, PRPs and EPA negotiate over
larger settlement issues, one of which may be the use of
Superfund money for recalcitrant parties whom the Agency will sue
later for cost recovery (CSI-Allocation, 1987).
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Intra-PRP negotiations over cost allocations are also of two
types: qualitative and quantitative (CSI-Allocation, 1987).
Quantitative types are easier to settle because there exist site
records that provide a factual basis for allocation. Qualitative
allocations, however, have few or no site records upon which to
base a factual division of costs.
Quantitative allocations are divided into two phases. In
the first phase, volumetric contributions are determined and, in
the second phase, these volumes are transformed into dollars
based on issues of equity involving toxicity, de minimis
contributors, degree of site involvement, and lawfulness of
disposal. At this stage, subjective and emotional perceptions of
the PRPs must be transformed into money allocations through
mathematical formulas, a process that one consultant called "a
combination of art and science" (CSI-Allocation, 1987).
Qualitative allocations, on the other hand, are harder to
obtain and therefore demand a process that can fairly and
objectively allocate costs. Even with qualitative allocations,
however, disputes arise over both factual and legal issues. In
these cases, experts hired by either side will be perceived as
biased. Allocation agreements, therefore, are best handled by a
neutral party. In fact, one private (non-private) firm, Clean
Sites, Inc., was created just for this purpose."
Neutrals can allow each party equal decision-making
opportunity regardless of its status at the site. They often
establish groundrules for participation that the group sets
1' See Clean Sites, Inc., page 61.
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themselves (CSI-Allocation, 1987). Most importantly, however,
allocation requires scientific and technical expertise to help
set allocation formulas. For this purpose, using neutrals offers
a better way than traditional means to handle scientific and
technical data through joint fact-finding and collaborative
problem-solving.
Even though neutrals are indispensable during this early
stage of remedial action, EPA does not become involved in
allocation issues. EPA officials firmly believe that allocation
disputes among PRPs are not the Agency's responsibility.
Although it provides PRPs with available information, the Agency
does not have enough staff to obtain other information needed by
PRPs. Therefore, the Agency limits efforts during PRP searches
and lets PRPs allocate the total cost. In many cases, the
Agency's position of non-involvement can be effective. However,
in other situations, such as when PRPs fail to hire a mediator to
allocate costs or when PRPs drop out of negotiations, greater EPA
involvement is necessary for settlement.
EPA should strongly encourage the PRPs to hire a mediator to
help them identify other PRPs; coordinate meetings; and devise
cost allocation formulas. The cost allocation arrangements would
be similar to apportioning de minimis contributions. Mediators
can also work with both the Agency and PRPs to work out joint
data gathering to aid PRPs in allocation arrangements. To
address EPA's resource constraints, PRPs could reimburse the
Agency for its time while EPA conducts a more extensive PRP
search. Such an agreement would take advantage of EPA's
specialized skills at no cost to the Agency.
Using a mediator benefits PRPs by allowing confidential
information to be used to allocate costs without disclosing it to
EPA. Once PRPs know how liability will be apportioned, it can
form a more united steering committee to negotiate with the
Agency over the details of the work. EPA benefits by having the
PRPs available to negotiate earlier in the process. The sooner
that PRPs agree on allocation costs and the sooner they form a
steering committee to negotiate with the Agency, the earlier they
can start productive negotiations. In addition, an allocation
agreement will set the tone for a positive working relationship
with the Agency. Having already experienced a successful
negotiation, PRPs will be more inclined toward conciliation
during the next stage of negotiations.
EPA should foster agreement on allocation issues even if the
major phase financially is during cleanup. Agreements build upon
one another as relationships between negotiators solidify. Even
if officials don't perceive that the short-term benefits of
spending time in early negotiations are justified, the longer-
term benefit of remedial action settlement may be well worth the
time.
This chapter described how ADR can be used to overcome
settlement obstacles in the areas of participation, information
sharing and development, flexibility, and allocation. Except for
the section on allocation, most of these ADR applications have
not been attempted in Superfund negotiations. However, because
these concepts are so firmly embedded in the alternative dispute
resolution literature, there is reason to believe that they can
work at Superfund sites. In the next chapter, however, I will
discuss why I think the Agency has been so reluctant to use ADR
and will give suggestions for ways that Headquarters can get the
Regions to be more responsive.
Chapter 3: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AT EPA:
OBSTACLES AND IMPLEMENTATION
ADR provides a reason to be hopeful about overcoming
settlement obstacles and cleaning up Superfund sites more
efficiently. In fact, ADR is already being used successfully to
resolve commercial, domestic, and labor conflicts and shows
promise for adaptation to environmental enforcement disputes. In
addition, the Administrative Conference of the U.S. has actively
promoted the greater use of ADR methods in the federal government
(Admin. Conf. 1987).
Despite the promise that ADR holds for its application to
Superfund, EPA has not yet incorporated it into the Superfund
enforcement process. Even though Headquarters advocates its use,
Regional officials have not been as favorable.
I begin this chapter by describing a memorandum and guidance
document on ADR sent by Headquarters to the Regions. I then
discuss EPA's experiences with ADR in Superfund. The main focus
of this chapter, however, is the barriers to ADR at EPA and
specific suggestions for the implementation of ADR in Superfund
cases. The final segment contains protocols to be used as
guidance for incorporating ADR at a Superfund site.
EPA Guidance on Alternative Dispute Resolution
Enforcement personnel in the Regions and Headquarters have
been increasingly concerned with the number, length, and
complexity of enforcement actions. An October 2, 1985 memorandum
entitled "Settlement of Enforcement Actions Using Alternative
Dispute Resolution Techniques" described many of the obstacles to
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quick resolution of enforcement cases presented in Chapter 2.
The four-page memorandum presented ADR as a way "to resolve
enforcement actions more quickly but without making legal or
policy concessions." It described mediation, fact-finding, mini-
trials, and arbitration as resources that Headquarters would
provide to Regions that nominated cases for ADR use.
Headquarters also agreed to help the Regions choose cases; design
procedures for using ADR; and cover the cost of hiring an ADR
expert. Unfortunately, the memo failed to elicit any
nominations.
Two years later, EPA Headquarters sent an August 14, 1987
document entitled "Guidance on the Use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in EPA Enforcement Cases" to the Regions. It
described the characteristics of enforcement cases suitable for
ADR; procedures for approval of cases for ADR; steps in the
selection of neutrals; and procedures for management of ADR
cases.
The ADR methods described in the guidance are, once again,
mediation, arbitration, fact-finding, and mini-trials. The
document presented the following characteristics of enforcement
cases suitable for ADR:
1) "When there is an impasse, or the possibility of an
impasse, due to personality conflicts; poor
communication; the existence of multiple parties with
conflicting interests; the existence of difficult
technical issues; unwillingness by the court to move the
case; or the existence of high visibility concerns that
make it difficult for the parties to settle;
2) When resource constraints are problematic, or when using
ADR can yield significant resource savings, such as in
situations where there are a large number of parties or
issues;
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3) When resolution of the dispute might be enhanced by
parties not subject to the impending enforcement action
(i.e., state or local governmental units and citizen
groups) [Nicholas 1988]."
Attached to the guidance was a memorandum from the
Administrator promoting ADR and describing three ADR-related
tasks that EPA would undertake to "more effectively and
efficiently foster compliance": (1) Training of EPA staff to
relay the facts about ADR, dispel the notion that ADR use results
in less rigorous settlements, and show how ADR can help EPA meet
its own compliance objectives; (2) Outreach to the regulated
community telling them that EPA will be receptive to their
suggestions about ADR use in specific cases; and (3) Pilot cases
to explore and evaluate ADR use. In addition, the Administrator
urged Regional Administrators to nominate cases in which ADR
could be tested.
Poor Response To ADR Request
As of mid-March, 1988, only six of EPA's 10 regional offices
have responded to Administrator Lee Thomas' August 14, 1987 cover
letter requesting that each region nominate at least one case for
ADR testing. Of the nine total nominations, ADR processes are
being, or will be, used in only two of the cases (BNA 2 ADRR
107), neither of which are Superfund sites.20
20 ADR is now in progress in two cases: (1) Mediation is
proceeding in a dispute over a Clean Water Act violation between
EPA and the City of Sheridan, Wyoming; and (2) At the request of
a PCB facility owner, EPA will use a mini-trial to try and
resolve a dispute with the owner over a Toxic Substances Control
Act (TSCA) violation (Nicholas 1988).
55
Richard Mays, formerly senior enforcement counsel and acting
assistant administrator of EPA,2 1 characterized the regional
response to the administrator's appeal as "almost non-existent"
and concluded: "The enforcement of ADR programs has been born at
EPA and it is a noble and progressive experiment." However, he
says, unless this program is nurtured, "it will have a slow,
stunted growth and may wither (BNA 2 ADRR 107)."
EPA Experience With ADR in Superfund
To date, EPA has not used ADR in any Superfund enforcement
cases; Headquarters is still waiting for the Regions to nominate
sites. The Agency has confined its use of ADR to facilitation at
non-enforcement sites where there are no PRPs (Robinson 1988).
Facilitation at these sites typically includes the site community
and state and local governmental agencies. Facilitation in these
cases usually is viewed as a supplement to community relations
efforts.
Most of EPA's knowledge of ADR in Superfund has come through
private firms that offer services to PRPs. However, these ADR
applications do not include EPA as a party; the Agency negotiates
with the PRPs after, or concurrent to, the involvement of a
neutral, but EPA is not a participant in either facilitation or
mediation under these circumstances (Robinson 1988).
The Agency's first experiences with ADR were with negotiated
rulemaking and the use of neutral facilitators at Superfund sites
21 Mays is now employed at ICF, a national environmental
consulting firm.
(Nicholas 1988). EPA has used negotiated rulemaking - where a
neutral facilitates discussion among representatives of
interested groups to jointly promulgate a proposed rule - in six
rulemakings (Nicholas 1988). In addition, the Superfund
Community Relations program has used facilitators at three
Superfund sites to help EPA define and address certain community
relations problems (EPA-Fac Report).
EPA Superfund Facilitation Pilot Projects
EPA Headquarters experimented with facilitation at three
sites: Nyanza Chemical Waste Dump - Ashland, Massachusetts
(Region I); Old Mill - Rock Creek, Ohio (Region V); and Tillicum
Area - near Tacoma, Washington (Region X). Each facilitation
began in October 1985 and was concluded in July 1986.
The "Superfund Dispute Resolution Pilot Project Report"
[undated], which evaluated the three facilitations, concluded
that at two of the sites, the participants generated tangible
products that would probably not have been possible without a
facilitator. At all three sites, EPA used an outside facilitator
to supplement its community relations activities. However, in
each case, the facilitator helped the group reach different
goals.
At the Nyanza site, the Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Quality Engineering (DEQE) and EPA disagreed on the
type of community relations activities to conduct and which
agency should conduct them. A facilitator assisted EPA and DEQE
in developing a written agreement specifying each agency s
responsibility for community relations. The document was
approved by the Nyanza Citizens Advisory Committee before
becoming final. This agreement served as the model for community
involvement at all sites in Massachusetts.
The facilitator at the Old Mill site entered a seven-year
dispute between the community and EPA regarding Superfund removal
and remedial efforts. After three facilitated meetings,
facilitation enabled the Agency to re-establish communication
with the community, although consensus was not reached on the
purpose of continued EPA/community interaction.
In the Tillicum area case, the facilitator helped EPA reach
agreement with seven local, State, and Federal agencies regarding
each one's responsibilities for site investigations. As part of
their Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the eight agencies
established a Task Force to coordinate all groundwater
investigations. The task force also developed a communications
strategy to advise neighboring communities of field
investigations activities.
From these experiences, the Pilot Project Report recommended
that a facilitator be used: (1) when normal community relations
activities have not been or are not likely to be successful; (2)
when an impartial person will help resolve differences by
identifying and including all interests and enforcing meeting
groundrules; (3) when there is adequate time for discussions;
(4) to manage meeting process so participants can focus on
content; and (5) early, rather than late, in the Superfund
process.
Unfortunately, the Report did not establish clear costs and
benefits of using the facilitators, therefore muddling the
evaluation process. Although each facilitation took more time
than expected, participants' responses (obtained through
questionnaires) do not indicate that time was a factor in their
dissatisfaction. Even though the Pilot Project Report produced
useful insights regarding the use of facilitation at Superfund
sites, its conclusion was unclear as to when the Agency advocates
its use:
In general, facilitation can provide EPA with new
and/or additional opportunities to involve the public
in the decision-making process. However, it behooves
the Agency to consider the circumstances at each
Superfund site in determining whether or not
facilitation is the most suitable community relations
technique to apply. The experience gained through
this project about facilitation should provide the
Agency with important insights into a dispute reso-
lution technique that may be useful at times (p. 17).
It is unfortunate that EPA did not provide adequate funds
for a more detailed evaluation of such an important test for ADR.
In relation to the cost of providing facilitation and Regional
staff time to prepare for and attend meetings, evaluation costs
were minimal. Questionnaires are not enough. EPA should have
gotten direct formal feedback from participants after carefully
designing a methodology for evaluation. Maybe it is due to these
inconclusive results that Regional Superfund staff have not
increased their use of facilitation as a result of the project
(Gemmill 1988).
After the facilitation Pilots ended, the project was
completely dropped (Robinson 1988). Richard Robinson, an ADR
advocate at Headquarters, considers the project a failure because
there was no thought given to evaluating and using the
information for future implementation. Robinson cites three
reasons for failure: (1) people who managed the project were
assigned to other work after project completion; (2) project
manager supervisors were not interested in ADR; and (3) people
who managed project were not persistent and driven enough to push
the issue forward. The only result was that Community Relations
added a paragraph in their handbook telling staff to consider
using a facilitator.
Other Agency ADR Efforts at Superfund Sites
Besides the three facilitations discussed above, EPA has
used facilitators during at least two other occasions, both in
Region 122 : (1) New Bedford Harbor, where a facilitator from
ICF, Inc. organized all affected parties for inclusion of their
comments in the community relations plan; and (2) Union Chemical
Company, where EPA used a neutral from Booz, Allen, & Hamilton to
moderate community meetings and help the Community Relations
Coordinator interview residents to incorporate their comments
into the community relations plan. EPA's Region I Community
Relations Coordinator described both these experiences as very
positive (D'Andrea 1988).
EPA's most recent effort regarding ADR has been to advocate
its use in small cost recovery claims. Headquarters currently is
22 It is likely that EPA has used facilitators at other non-
enforcement sites in other Regions, although I focused on Region
I's experiences.
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developing regulations to establish procedures to use binding
arbitration in Superfund small cost recovery claims (i.e., claims
involving $500,000 or less). The current draft establishes a
voluntary system whereby either EPA or the PRPs can request
binding arbitration for the resolution of one or more issues in
the claim. The draft defines the jurisdiction of the arbitrator
(including the standard of review to be applied by the
arbitrator); the procedures for referral of claims; and the
process for selecting an arbitrator (Nicholas 1988).23
Private Efforts to Use ADR at Superfund Sites
In addition to EPA's own efforts to use neutrals at
Superfund sites, at least two private firms provide ADR services:
Clean Sites, Inc. and, more recently, ICF, Inc.
Clean Sites, Inc.
Clean Sites, Inc. (CSI) is a non-profit group based in
Alexandria, Virginia that built its reputation by mediating cost
allocations and now provides a range of ADR services to PRPs and
EPA to speed cleanups. CSI started in May 1984 as a joint effort
between industry and environmental groups and has such notable
personalities on its Board of Directors as Russell E. Train and
Douglas M. Costle, two former EPA Administrators; as well as Jay
D. Hair, President - National Wildlife Federation; and H. Eugene
McBrayer, President - Exxon Chemical Company. Although EPA has
2" No further information is available on these regulations
at this time.
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backed its efforts, the Agency cautions its staff about using
Clean Sites in cases where there may be a conflict of interest
(EPA-OSWER-Role of CSI, 1987). According to its 1986 Yearly
Report, Clean Sites received 69.7% of its 1986 Revenues from
corporate contributions, although they plan to increasingly
charge their clients (corporate and government) fees and reduce
flat contributions.
ADR methods used by CSI include: identifying and organizing
PRPs; providing technical assistance; and facilitation among
PRPs, government, and the community (OSWER-CSI). Over the past
three and a half years, CSI has completed cost allocation
agreements at 17 sites and helped PRPs and/or governmental
agencies "move toward achieving a voluntary settlement or
cleanup" at more than 50 sites (CSI-Taking Stock, 1987). In
addition, CSI has helped bring about 16 final settlement
agreements to conduct removals, remedial actions, or cleanup
studies costing a total of $119-million. It has also managed
several site cleanup operations (CSI-Taking Stock, 1987).
CSI has provided all three types of neutral assistance -
facilitation, mediation, and arbitration - although it is
involved most often as a mediator between PRPs. In addition to
mediating cost allocations, CSI has helped EPA and responsible
parties (RPs) conduct de minimis "buy-outs"; organized 700 RPs to
undertake a voluntary removal; mediated a state/PRP agreement on
an RI/FS; and arbitrated a mixed funding settlement.
Agency guidance (OSWER-"Role of Clean Sites, 1987) outlines
its policy for conducting business with CSI. It describes: CSI's
current capabilities; when CSI may participate in Agency
mediation; how officials should interact with CSI; whether and
how to indemnify CSI (when CSI cannot obtain sufficient liability
insurance); and how CSI's funding sources may be a conflict of
interest.
Headquarters recommends that the Regions allow CSI to
participate in reviews of PRP RI/FSs; be site project managers;
organize PRPs; and act as liaison between all site negotiators.
However, the Agency does not yet advocate using CSI for mediation
during formal negotiation between the Agency, PRPs, and other
parties, although it does leave such judgement to the Regions.
The Agency currently does not use mediation for formal
negotiations in which it is involved.
ICF, Inc.
One other large private group offering Superfund mediation
services is ICF, Inc., also in Virginia. ICF is a consulting
firm that specializes in environmental, energy, health, and
safety issues. ICF performed facilitation and community
relations work at Superfund sites before becoming involved as a
mediator. ICF performs administrative services for negotiating
parties; identifies PRPs; and performs cost allocations. The
firm's first year of business was 1987; there has been too little
information to assess ICF's effectiveness.
OBSTACLES TO ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AT EPA
Over the past three years, the Agency has had limited
experience with neutrals in Superfund operations. In addition,
most of these contacts have been through Clean Sites and none
involve neutrals in formal negotiations at enforcement sites.
Although Headquarters guidance indicates that it is ready to
experiment with ADR, Regional response has been slow to accept
the offer. This section explores possible obstacles to the use
of ADR in the Regions. By understanding the reasons behind the
Region's resistance, Headquarters can more adequately plan for
implementation.
Lack of ADR Advocates
There are few people at EPA involved with ADR on a regular
basis, although the Office of Enforcement Policy (OEP) within the
Office of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring (OECM) spearheads
the Agency's ADR activities. Even though upper-level EPA
officials, including the Administrator, promote ADR, Regional
officials have not used these methods in any cases. "So far,
active support for ADR appears to be limited primarily to high-
level management at EPA... Overall, the use of ADR at EPA appears
to be lagging well behind the hopes and expectations of those who
actively support the concept (Nicholas 1988 p. 1)."
Regional. support for ADR ranges from a half-hearted open-
mindedness (in about half the Regions) to skepticism (in the
other half) (Nicholas 1988). For the most part, those who
advocate ADR do not understand the methods well enough to
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convince regional staff who are not inclined to use them. In
addition, Regional officials typically resent a directive from
Headquarters ordering them to change their behavior, this time in
significant ways for what appear to them to be few benefits.
Misperceptions of ADR
Regional resistance to ADR arises partly from a limited
understanding of available dispute resolution techniques and
common misperceptions that reflect this lack of knowledge. It is
evident from reading even the most recent EPA documents regarding
ADR and Superfund that EPA has little understanding of ADR
processes. In fact, more often than not, ADR is equated with
binding arbitration in which the Agency would lose control of its
decision-making authority.
The "Airlie Conference Report" is a prime example of EPA's
inadequate understanding of ADR. Although it accurately outlined
the views of EPA and industry representatives regarding ADR use
in Superfund settlements, the report failed to correct the
participants' erroneous views. Explaining EPA's reluctance to
use ADR, John Quarles wrote:
EPA participants voiced concern over submitting
disputes to a neutral third party for binding
decisions.. .Moreover, EPA participants noted that
allowing a neutral third party to resolve disputes
could be tantamount to the Agency delegating its
responsibility for remedy selection (Airlie p.16).
Quarles also discussed industry's views on ADR, but again in
a distorted way: "...industry participants noted that a neutral
reviewer is important even if his decision is non-
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binding(p.17)." To industry representatives, neutrals were
depicted as advisers and reviewers of work. Unfortunately,
Quarrels did not correct this distortion and declare that ADR
offers a better process by which conflicts can be resolved.
With regard to Headquarters' support, it is surprising that
a three-day conference (October 20-22, 1987) devoted entirely to
Superfund settlements resulted in a seventeen page report with a
passing reference to dispute resolution as binding arbitration on
the last two pages. In fact, there was no mention of the range
of ADR techniques, most of which do not involve binding
procedures and leave full control of the process in the hands of
the negotiators. EPA officials need to distinguish between
binding arbitration and the other voluntary procedures to know
when to use each.
In contrast to the lack of attention paid to ADR in the
Airlie report, EPA's "Guidance on the Use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in EPA Enforcement Cases" correctly hails the use of
ADR as an important process change. Unfortunately, the guidance
did not mention facilitation as an ADR technique, although it is
the most process-oriented ADR method.
Endispute reports another common misperception - that
negotiators tend to believe that neutrals are valuable only when
an impasse has been reached and the traditional negotiating
process has broken down. Such beliefs do not account for the
benefit of using neutrals to avoid costly delays due to
stalemate. Conversely, not using a neutral and waiting for
impasse may sour relations so much that litigation becomes the
only option.
One possible misperception may arise over confusion with the
phrase "alternative" dispute resolution. ADR advocates must make
it clear that ADR is not an "alternative" to the enforcement
process but a supplement to traditional dispute resolution. It
is a different process by which to negotiate.
This misperception is not to blame on EPA officials. The
phrase "alternative dispute resolution" is defined in the dispute
resolution literature as an alternative to the court system
through which parties can resolve their differences voluntarily
(Goldberg, Green, and Sander, 1985; Susskind and Cruikshank,
1987; Bingham 1986; Admin. Conf. 1987). This definition can
easily be mistaken to also mean an alternative to formal
negotiation. However, as applied in Superfund, ADR should assist
enforcement negotiators and not usurp their control over the
outcome of the process.
A final misperception is that non-adversarial ADR techniques
are less rigorous than traditional dispute resolution (Nicholas
1988). EPA officials with this belief confuse good negotiation
and being soft on PRPs. They usually are either uninformed about
ADR or are inexperienced negotiators.
Potential for "Sweetheart Deals"
Perhaps the most subtle but powerful obstacle to invigorated
settlement efforts is the fear among EPA staff that negotiations
will get them in trouble with Congress and the public because of
their past negative associations with PRPs. These officials
don't want to give the impression that through negotiations they
are "giving in" to PRPs. Therefore, they avoid negotiations.
These staff would rather force the PRPs to settle through
litigation rather than negotiating face-to-face where discretion
is needed to offer tradeoffs. Since ADR emphasizes negotiations,
this concern is a barrier to using ADR in the Regions.
This fear is certainly a legitimate concern considering past
EPA operations. When the Reagan Administration took office in
1980, EPA had just begun to implement the Superfund program and
Ann Gorsuch was chosen to be the Administrator. "Between mid-
1981 and mid-1983, internal dissention, reduced funding and
staffing, and several reorganizations impaired operations
throughout the EPA (Anderson 1985, p. 280)". During the early
Superfund years, the term "negotiation" became synonymous with
"sweetheart deals" with PRPs, as EPA took an all-carrot and no-
stick approach to settlements. The Agency appeared to use
program delays and private cleanup agreements to keep
expenditures low so that Congress would not need to reauthorize
the Superfund in 1985 (Anderson 1985).
Critics charged that the EPA had relaxed cleanup
requirements as an inducement to private parties to
clean up sites themselves, had agreed to cost-
reimbursement settlements short of what the Fund
should recover under the statute, had allowed politics
to interfere with the proper administration of the
Fund, and, in general, had failed to follow acceptable
management practices (Anderson 1985, p. 280).24
24 Rita Lavelle, the Head of the Superfund program was
later convicted of perjury in connection with her Congressional
testimony and of obstructing Congressional investigations.
Reports later surfaced regarding collusion by Lavelle with
companies involved in cleanup litigation (Anderson).
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In 1984, after more than fifteen top EPA officials either
resigned or were fired, a new get-tough strategy was initiated.
EPA shied away from further negotiations with PRPs for fear that
the public and Congress would criticize them for using a strategy
that previously led to corrupt practice (Anderson).
After the Gorsuch years, EPA worked hard to regain public
trust while pushing to clean up sites. They began with a
strategy to recover 100% of the cleanup costs and used the Fund
money to conduct the cleanup. This strategy was far safer for
them than the previous negotiations with PRPs. As long as they
stayed clear of PRP negotiations, no one could accuse them of
corruption (Anderson).
Although EPA negotiators have begun to display a more
reasonable philosophy toward resolving disputes, they still must
overcome past associations with lax settlements. This barrier is
proving difficult to break in the face of Congressional oversight
that has been critical of EPA's management of the Superfund
program.
Resistance to ADR Concepts
Although some officials have moved away from a rigid
negotiating posture, the majority have maintained an approach
that cannot be justified in light of current Superfund goals.
They don't believe that other parties should have equal
opportunity to negotiate and don't see using joint and several
liability as a problem for the Agency. These officials thrive on
the adversarial relationships developed through traditional
negotiation and litigation and care little for concepts of
cooperation and consensus. As long as Congress gave EPA the
power to decide, they believe there is no need for an alternative
process.
Many officials believe that EPA should never "compromise,"
and view this word as synonymous with "selling out" to PRPs.
They believe that negotiations with PRPs may soften the Agency's
tough enforcement posture and produce weak agreements. Even when
this approach leads to unnecessary and costly delays, officials
maintain an uncompromising negotiating posture. The EPA strategy
has been characterized as "more to do with obtaining a legal
victory than with reducing waste hazards and completing cost-
effective cleanups (Anderson 1985, p. 298-299)."
Attorneys and others with legal training tend to view
litigation as the only or best way to resolve disputes. If ADR
becomes a major means of dispute resolution at EPA, attorneys are
fearful that their enforcement role might be diminished (Nicholas
1988). To some extent, if successful, ADR will reduce the
Agency's need to litigate and thus save money. Those who think
litigation is the only way to resolve a dispute need to rethink
their position and learn more about ADR methods. EPA, however,
will not satisfy all its staff if it embraces ADR as a
supplemental settlement strategy.
Maintaining the Status Quo
Since EPA officials don't fully understand ADR, they prefer
to err on the side of the status quo (Nicholas 1988). This is a
common phenomenon:
Innovation focuses responsibility on the bureaucratic
entrepreneur who brought the change about and disturbs
the balance of accommodations that have been worked
out among administrative peers. If the innovation
fails, the innovator can expect to be treated as a
scapegoat who can be punished with traditional
sanctions such as reorganization, loss of staff, or
transfer. Speeding up the rate of Superfund site
responses by whatever means will require a certain
amount of risk-taking to overcome these inherent
bureaucratic tendencies (Anderson 1985, p.313).
Ira Leighton, Region I's CT Superfund Branch Chief,
expressed this same attitude. Leighton chooses the cleanup
strategy that offers the greatest possibility of success within
the fixed resources he is allocated. He sees no reason to gamble
on a new idea with potentially disastrous consequences. "On the
spectrum of risk/reward possibilities, I have chosen the middle
road. On one end would be no negotiations with PRPs; at the
other end would be full scale ADR and lengthy up-front
negotiations. I have chosen the middle road of minimal
negotiations with PRPs."
Other EPA staff, however, maintain the status quo because
they might make mistakes while negotiating. Whereas traditional
dispute resolution limits negotiations in favor of the Fund or
litigation, ADR advocates more negotiation. Inexperienced
negotiators, therefore, will feel insecure about negotiating with
PRPs and opt for the more familiar dispute resolution methods.
Using ADR is Too Risky
Taking a risk means that the stakes are high, which is
precisely another argument offered for why ADR is not used in
Superfund. Remedial settlements range from $5-million to $50-
million (Leighton 1988). Even though negotiating settlements at
this phase is worthwhile for EPA, 2 " Superfund managers think ADR
is too risky for experimentation. Leighton said that using ADR
in large-scale, high-stakes RI/FSs or remedial actions is "a
resource gamble that I can't afford to take. If ADR doesn't work
fast enough to cleanup sites, I would fail as a manager and lose
the gamble (Leighton 1988)."
Since ADR is still a new concept, even those at Headquarters
who advocate its use see so only in limited settings. The one
category of cases most often recommended for ADR is small cost
recovery cases after removal action, which usually involves costs
ranging from $5,000 to $100,000. EPA considers these cases too
small to litigate and thus may be more open to other dispute
resolution techniques (Leighton 1988).2" However, EPA officials
are not yet open to using ADR in other phases of remedial action,
either because it is too risky in terms of cost or because they
aren't aware of ADR's potential.
25 As mentioned earlier, EPA does not like to conduct
lengthy negotiations during the RI/FS phase because of the low
stakes and high transaction costs.
26 Leighton is not responsible for removal action cases and
did not know if those in charge were inclined to use ADR.
Lack of Incentives to Use ADR
Just as incentives are needed to entice PRPs to conduct
cleanups, tangible incentives for EPA officials who use ADR are
also required. Such encouragement makes further sense in light
of the perception that using ADR is risky and that making
mistakes using new concepts may bring Agency retribution.
Currently, however, there is no real incentive for EPA mangers to
experiment with ADR; they don't get credit for being innovative
and pioneering (Nicholas 1988). If EPA truly wants to change the
attitudes of its staff regarding ADR, it needs to encourage
negotiators to experiment by using neutrals and reward those who
succeed. For example, Headquarters could reward Regional staff
by giving greater Agency recognition or by linking ADR use to
promotion. Similarly, Headquarters must be tolerant of staff who
make mistakes while testing the new methods.
Lack of Time and Resources to Negotiate
Even if EPA managers were inclined to use ADR techniques,
staff are motivated by financial constraints to use the Fund
instead of taking the time to negotiate. Superfund costs can be
divided into two parts: Front-end planning costs to study the
sites, devise RI/FSs, and negotiate, and Back-end "bulldozer
money" for the RD/RA and actual cleanup. Headquarters program
managers put more money in cleanups than they do for
negotiations. Therefore, Regional site managers have more
incentive to use the Fund and less to negotiate. Although the
lack of time and resources to negotiate is a barrier to
negotiation, it also becomes an obstacle to ADR by association.
EPA Region I official Ira Leighton believes that the concept
of ADR is a good one and that it might yield better results in
Superfund. However, he feels that it can't work in the Superfund
process because it ignores the realities of resource and time
constraints under risky conditions. ADR is resource and time
intensive on the front-end where negotiations occur between PRPs
and EPA. He feels that even though ADR may save both time and
money over the long run, the Superfund process is not flexible
enough to either allocate extra resources or shift resources to
the front-end. "The resources for EPA", he says, "are thin and
fixed by the Office of Management and Budget." Since the Regions
have the money to implement the remedies by hiring construction
companies to cleanup the sites, they spend very little time on
PRP negotiations.
Site managers are under tremendous pressure to move sites
through the cleanup process. EPA Headquarters is also under
pressure to initiate cleanups and therefore favors any strategy
that it believes will bring it closer to this goal. However,
such a strategy may not be capable of promoting the number
settlements needed under the amendments:
The Reagan appointees at EPA and OMB think that
bulldozer money is good because it drives the economy
and that hiring government employees is foolish... They
do not understand that they can reach their goals of
more PRP settlements by hiring additional EPA project
managers and other front-end staff (Leighton 1988).
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Superfund managers are perplexed over the purpose of the
CERCLA amendments. According to Ira Leighton, Congress produced
a statute that is at odds with itself. On one hand, it wanted
sites cleaned up as quickly and cheaply as possible. On the
other hand, Congress also wanted PRPs to take more leads in site
cleanup and construction. The goal of rapid cleanups necessarily
conflicts with the up-front time needed to negotiate with PRPs to
have them conduct cleanups. Leighton predicts that the next
CERCLA reauthorization will have to choose between one of these
two competing demands.
This last section outlined factors that contribute to
Regional apathy regarding the use of ADR. It does not mean,
however, that there is not hope for the Agency to incorporate
these methods into enforcement. In the next section, I provide
suggestions for how Headquarters can increase ADR use in the
Regions. These recommendations not only include overcoming
obstacles to ADR but, if implemented, will also address
settlement obstacles, particularly those concerning EPA
officials' negotiating postures.
IMPLEMENTATION OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AT EPA
Despite Headquarters apparent interest in incorporating ADR
methods into the Superfund enforcement process, it has passively
approached the Regions. Changing attitudes in a bureaucracy
requires a major effort. By solely sending guidance documents to
the Regions, Headquarters will not produce the change it desires.
The Agency needs to be active in reaching out to Regional
officials and working more cooperatively with them to address
their concerns about ADR. For widespread change, there need to
be ADR advocates in the Regions too.
It is essential that EPA take a comprehensive approach to
implementing ADR. This section describes four specific
recommendations that EPA can take to ensure that its staff use
neutrals and other ADR methods in negotiations: (1) Facilitated
Dialogues; (2) Negotiation/ADR Training; (3) Pilot Projects; and
(4) Demonstration Protocols. The Agency will be in the best
position to overcome barriers to ADR if these recommendations are
implemented together.
Each recommendation is designed to cover an important aspect
of implementation. Facilitated dialogues are meant to allow a
forum for an exchange of ideas and beliefs regarding ADR between
Headquarters and the Regions and between EPA and other parties.
Trainings will teach good negotiating techniques and demonstrate
ADR methods through simulations. Once they have learned and
practiced their skills, officials can test them in pilot
projects. However, to assist negotiators, demonstration
protocols will provide step-by-step guidance for incorporating
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ADR in the enforcement process.
FACILITATED DIALOGUES
I see the need for two types of ADR facilitated dialogues:
One between EPA Headquarters and selected Regional Superfund
staff and another between EPA officials and key representatives
of other interested parties, including PRPs, state and local
officials, and environmental/civic organizations. I believe that
EPA officials and other parties would be more inclined to use
neutrals if they participated in a successful experience when one
was used. If these people were present at a productive
collaborative problem-solving session conducted by a professional
neutral, they would lose many of their preconceptions that have
become barriers to ADR's implementation.
The purpose of these dialogues would be for EPA to announce
its intention to actively experiment with ADR. The Agency not
only would brief its audience on ADR methods but would answer
questions and accept advice on better implementation procedures.
This strategy would provide a forum for new obstacles to ADR and
negotiation to surface so that the Agency will better know what
it will take to implement ADR. Such active and open involvement
of relevant parties would be the appropriate way to introduce an
idea based on cooperation and consensus. The goals of the
dialogues, however, would depend on the audience.
Interagency Dialogues
EPA must first reach consensus among high-level managers
about the direction and policy changes the Agency should take
regarding ADR. Officials at Headquarters should meet with top
Regional officials to discuss the proposed new direction. The
Regions must be included in policy on ADR and innovative
settlement ideas or else it will be harder to get them to accept
the changes.
I propose the following model: Top Regional officials (i.e.
one each from the Office of Regional Counsel, Waste Management,
and Community Relations) would represent the Region's Superfund
staff and discuss Headquarters ADR strategy through dialogues
facilitated by a non-EPA expert. The group's initial goals could
be to obtain a general agreement on the obstacles to both
settlement and ADR implementation and a commitment to use ADR in
the Superfund enforcement process. Headquarters must find out,
in person, the reasons behind the Region's rejection of ADR and
try to address these interests and apprehensions. Later goals
could be to negotiate a single text (like the protocols discussed
on page 90) to provide specific guidance to all the Regions
regarding ADR at various stages in the negotiations process.
One major issue that EPA officials need to address is the
conditions under which Headquarters will allocate resources for
pilot projects, trainings, and other ADR-related activities.
Without funding and a plan for action, verbal commitments and
guidance will have little impact. Also, Regional officials must
meet with key staff to determine whether they can carry out the
new procedures and under which conditions they will commit to its
use. Those who implement the policies must be as dedicated to
ADR's success as those who write them.
EPA/Other Party Dialogues
EPA already holds dialogues with industry and other groups
to discuss Superfund-related obstacles. The Airlie Conference
provided a forum to discuss issues important to all parties, most
notably EPA and PRPs. Similar conferences, devoted solely to ADR
and facilitated by a non-EPA expert would be an efficient way for
the Agency to announce that it is activating an existing policy
that fosters cooperation to reach settlement.
These dialogues would begin with briefings on ADR facts and
focus on obtaining a commitment from PRPs and other parties that
they will consider using neutrals to solve disputes. The
dialogues would be an excellent way to address specific issues of
concern to each party. For example, how will the neutral be
selected; who will pay for the neutral's services; what criteria
should be considered to ensure competence and neutrality; under
what circumstances to use a neutral; and to what extent this
policy changes public participation.
NEGOTIATION/ADR TRAINING
To counter inexperience and inflexibility among Superfund
negotiators, the Agency needs to train its staff in proper
negotiating techniques so they are better equipped to accept
trade-offs and offer incentives to PRPs to induce settlement. In
addition, to dispel misperceptions about ADR and eradicate
roadblocks to its implementation, the Agency should educate its
staff about the range of ADR methods. The hoped for result of
such trainings would be greater willingness by EPA Regional staff
to negotiate and a widespread acceptance and use of ADR methods.
Both ADR and negotiation trainings should involve site-
specific participatory simulations in which participants
negotiate over the same settlement obstacles they face in actual
negotiations. Adding a neutral to simulated negotiations easily
changes the dynamics and purpose of the simulation. Such
simulations enable participants to learn negotiation and ADR
techniques in only a few hours time.
Negotiation/ADR trainings should be divided between a
theoretical overview and role play simulations. Theory lends
context to the more specific simulation exercises. EPA and other
government negotiators must be shown that good negotiation
entails compromise and that this can still be consistent with a
tough enforcement attitude. Negotiators must recognize that
rigidity should be a selective strategy and that better solutions
can be realized through joint problem-solving. They also must
learn the theoretical basis for ADR's consensus-building
approaches and how these can help them reach settlement.
Simulations mirror the complex relationships at individual
sites by giving participants detailed written instructions that
provide them with the interests and positions of key parties.
Either by playing a familiar role or one that is associated with
another party, participants will practice with basic principles
of negotiation and ADR that will be beneficial in actual
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phase in the settlement process. For instance, EPA could have a
repertoire of 10 simulations involving different major phases in
the process where ADR and/or negotiation play a key role. The
Regions could even train specific EPA personnel to administer
these simulations in the regions. Instead of bringing all
Regional people to one workshop, the workshops could be organized
by each Region with Headquarters' assistance. Such an approach
would spread EPA policy in a consistent fashion to the Regions.
Negotiation/ADR trainings must be conducted on an ongoing
basis to have a lasting impact on the attitudes of negotiators.
Headquarters needs to routinize the trainings by including them
as line items in the yearly budget. The trainings also could be
linked to career development for each employee. For example, each
Superfund site negotiator would be required to complete a basic
training course. This would address the lack of interest for
voluntary trainings by those who resist ADR concepts.
Furthermore, those who completed an advanced training would be
eligible for example, for example to become an internal
negotiation adviser.
Site-specific simulations can provide EPA staff with the
confidence and ability to make innovative decisions during actual
negotiations. By providing the opportunity to practice with
negotiation and ADR techniques, officials will be more likely in
the future to implement them in actual negotiations. These
training programs can be a critical factor in turning concepts
from guidelines into practice.
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PILOT PROJECTS
EPA must be ready to turn its written ADR policies into
active practice on a limited case-by-case basis. Education on
ADR techniques will help change attitudes. However, before EPA
commits to a broad policy change, it needs to know more
information about the benefits of using ADR in Superfund
settlements. One way to obtain this data is through pilot
projects.
EPA Headquarters must prove that ADR can work in Superfund
and must establish a track record of success. Once the benefits
of using ADR become clearer, Regional officials will be more
willing to use them. Headquarters must be sensitive, however, to
the belief among Regional managers that ADR is currently too
risky to use in the majority of circumstances. Therefore, EPA
should conduct initial pilot projects in five areas: (1) small
cost recovery cases for removal action; (2) small less risky
segments of remedial action; (3) non-compliance controversies;
(4) unresolved enforcement leads with no Fund backing; and (5)
pre-NPL sites.
Removal Cost Recovery
Cost recovery in removals usually involves between $5,000
and $100,000. Due to these small amounts, the Agency does not
find it cost-effective to litigate. Removals often involve such
immediate and short-term action as fencing off contaminated
property; providing the community with an alternate source of
water; and posting warning signs. Headquarters currently
considers this category of cases to be the most likely candidate
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for use of ADR.
Recent Agency guidance ("Cost Recovery Actions/Statute of
Limitations," June 12, 1987) states that, "Due to the resource
commitment of litigation, the Agency has established that cost
recovery cases where the costs exceed $200,000 should take
priority for referral (p.3)." The result of such a policy is
that many cases under $200,000 are not resolved. In fact, of all
completed removal sites, EPA has only initiated cost recovery 29%
of the time (accounting for approximately 52% of the "available
obligations," or for those that the Agency feels it is
obligated). The Agency currently is establishing guidelines for
the use of binding arbitration in those cases where total costs
sought by the Agency are less than $500,000.27
Portions of Remedial Action
Since remedial action involves large sums of money, the
Agency should consider dividing the process into smaller discrete
segments and using ADR to accomplish a specific task. For
example, a facilitator could assist the PRPs and EPA to design a
Work Plan that satisfies Agency requirements and is acceptable to
PRPs. Also, joint factfinding could help resolve technical
disputes about the applicability of cleanup technologies. In
addition, the Agency could use a mediator to produce a consent
order for a low-cost RI/FS.
Non-Compliance
Conflicts over stipulated penalties during non-compliance
2 See page 60 - "Other Agency ADR Efforts at Superfund
Sites."
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provide an excellent opportunity for mediation. Although the
amount of money in dispute is small, these disagreements consume
large amounts of time and energy. The conflicts usually focus on
principle. More specifically, PRPs don't think the penalties are
fair so they don't pay them; EPA doesn't think it's fair that the
violations don't result in penalties. This type of dispute,
where emotions play a significant role, would be better served by
a mediator than by unassisted negotiation between the PRPs and
EPA.
Unresolved Enforcement Leads
As mentioned in Chapter 1 under Lead Agency Determination,
enforcement lead sites cannot use Fund money if negotiations
fail. Due to resource limitations, EPA cannot always litigate
unresolved enforcement-leads. This can often cause substantial
delay in the cleanup process. For this reason, ADR may be a
viable option to revive stalled negotiations.
Pre-NPL Sites
Even though the cleanup of pre-NPL sites may not yield
obvious Agency benefits, they may provide a good opportunity to
safely test ADR. Since these sites are not considered to be
priorities for cleanup, the community perceives them to be less
dangerous. This translates into a low site-profile and the
potential for experimentation. There are many opportunities for
the use of ADR during the pre-NPL phase. For example, a
facilitator could coordinate site sampling and analysis between
local, state, and federal governments. Also, a mediator could
help EPA and the state reach agreement on factors weighed in
scoring and ranking a site for inclusion on the NPL. Although
NPL sites should be EPA's prime focus, testing ADR methods in
pre-NPL sites may be a good short-term strategy until ADR becomes
more widely accepted for use at NPL sites.
The best way for ADR to gain acceptance is to achieve
demonstrable success in a limited number of "can't miss" cases
ripe for ADR in the five previous categories. EPA officials in
each region who are knowledgeable about the cases should work
with ADR experts to choose pilot projects. Criteria for
selection could include: (1) the likelihood for settlement by
traditional means; (2) whether one party suggested ADR or is
willing to use ADR; and (3) the potential for time and cost
savings. Once Headquarters is successful in less risky
circumstances, it can apply ADR to more risky remedial action
cases. However, even for the less risky test cases, Headquarters
should provide incentives to Regional officials and give them a
safety net for mistakes.
Pilot projects could be tied to negotiation/ADR trainings by
requiring all site negotiators to participate in simulations that
reflect the actual negotiation. Pilots could also serve as on-
site trainings for EPA negotiators not directly participating in
the dispute. Selected EPA staff could observe these pilots as
training to plan for their future involvement in negotiations.
To increase the likelihood that Regional officials will
nominate cases for pilot projects, EPA Headquarters should commit
additional funds to make the risk of using ADR worth taking. An
official in Region I (Leighton 1988) said he would use ADR only
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under the condition that he had additional staff during the RI/FS
and RD/RA negotiation phases. Only if Headquarters budgeted some
money would he be willing to gamble on the extra up-front
negotiations time. In this way, he would be backed by previously
budgeted resources to conduct the remedy if a settlement were not
reached.
The amount of funds needed for each pilot project should be
negotiated between Headquarters and the Regions. In addition,
the money for these pilot projects should be committed during the
SCAP process before EPA places a site on the NPL. This would
assure that funds were available and would contribute toward
changing attitudes by including ADR considerations in the
budgeting process.
For the Agency to budget for ADR, it needs to assess the
extra up-front costs that will be required. This assessment
would also provide the necessary monitoring of ADR required to
justify its more widespread use. By allocating costs up-front
and monitoring the benefits, EPA will know whether and how to
expand the use of ADR in Superfund.
Test cases must achieve tangible results in order to be
convincing. Therefore, test cases should shy away from goals of
"better communication" and try to accomplish tangible final
products (i.e., consent orders and work plans). Results from the
Superfund facilitation Pilot Project Report indicated that there
was greater success in the two sites that reached tangible goals
than the one whose goals were non-tangible.
This is not to say that other criteria for a "successful"
pilot project should not be applied. In fact, I urge the Agency
to include in their evaluation non-tangible criteria (in addition
to tangible efficiency-oriented criteria) such as the extent of
participation; satisfaction with the process; satisfaction with
the outcome; and achieving cooperation and maintaining positive
future working relationships.
EPA should develop their monitoring and evaluation
mechanisms for the pilot projects before they initiate the cases.
Headquarters will need to answer whether ADR techniques are any
better than traditional means of dispute resolution. They will
also want to know what categories of cases are ripe for ADR. To
get this information, EPA should design a methodology to obtain
detailed feedback from participants - either through interviews,
questionnaires, or post-pilot dialogues - that tries to answer to
whether or not ADR is better than traditional means for the
intended purpose.
DEMONSTRATION PROTOCOLS
Although there are hundreds of EPA documents outlining every
nuance of the Agency's policy, there is no document that provides
guidance to EPA staff on how to implement ADR. In fact, there is
no national guidance manual that describes the entire Superfund
enforcement process. The demonstration protocols document that
follows extends beyond existing EPA policy by overlaying ADR
applications onto the Superfund enforcement process.
The protocols document does not attempt to duplicate the
comprehensiveness of a training manual for EPA enforcement.
Instead, it is designed to be used as a working manual for
negotiators at pilot projects and other Superfund sites. In
general, it would serve two purposes: (1) give all interested
parties, including the public, an introduction into the Superfund
enforcement process; and (2) give EPA officials and other parties
an understanding of how ADR fits into the enforcement process.
Step-by-step protocols for implementation of ADR would
especially benefit those who are new to the Agency and
immediately get thrust into serious negotiations with experienced
PRPs. To keep these protocols current, Headquarters could update
them after each major policy change. In this way, they would
always be useful to new employees.
DEMONSTRATION PROTOCOLS
The Demonstration Protocols provide EPA staff with guidance
to incorporate ADR and other innovative settlement ideas into
Phase 1 of the Superfund enforcement process (see Figure 2). The
process, as I present it, is currently not explained in any EPA
document. The protocols reflect existing EPA policies that I
coalesced from numerous internal documents.
Immediately following the protocols at a number of the
enforcement steps, I provide recommendations when I feel that the
present policy is inadequate to accomplish the maximum amount of
PRP settlements. These recommendations include either a
supplement to, or change in, existing protocols.
These protocols do not present an alternative approach to
what enforcement staff are now accustomed. Instead, they provide
staff with options to assist them in settlement negotiations.
The protocols focus on the responsibilities of enforcement staff,
but include those of site managers and community relations staff
as they relate to settlement negotiations. With such detailed
guidance, Regional staff will better understand what ADR is and
how it can help them accomplish their goals. With this
familiarity and understanding, Regional officials may even be
prompted to nominate test pilot projects and incorporate some of
these new concepts.
Since enforcement actions vary at each site, this section
cannot address every situation that will arise. Rather, it
provides a chronological summary of basic enforcement activities
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that may need to be rearranged at the discretion of Regional
staff. The recommendations that appear at the end of each Phase
are options from which EPA staff can choose according to specific
site conditions.
Although a head lawyer in EPA Region 1 - Office of Regional
Counsel reviewed the protocols, they should not be considered EPA
policy without first checking with EPA enforcement staff. The
protocols appear in the format outlined by EPA in its guidance
document, "Guidelines for Producing Superfund Documents" (OSWER
9200.4-1). EPA officials will be more likely to use such a
document if it appears in this familiar format.
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SUPERFUND ENFORCEMENT PROCESS
COMPONENT 1 - REMEDIAL ACTION
PHASE 1. INITIAL REMEDIAL RESPONSE
A. PRELIMINARY AND BASELINE PRP SEARCHES
EPA generally regards owners, operators, generators, and
transporters as PRPs. The statutory definition for PRP is
explained in Section 107(a) of CERCLA. The preliminary PRP
search (see Figure 2) is the first action to be taken by
Superfund enforcement personnel and thus is crucial in
determining a cleanup strategy. Early PRP identification
supports EPA policy to secure cleanup by PRPs in lieu of using
the Superfund (see PRP Search Manual). EPA hires civil
investigators to track down PRPs who are difficult to find.
1. Importance of PRP Search
The PRP search is important for two basic reasons:
(a) In order to secure private party cleanup through
negotiation, PRPs must be identified, and
(b) If EPA uses the Fund to finance cleanup, PRPs must
be identified for cost recovery actions. PRP
searches should be supplemented by issuance of
information request letters (see 4(a) below), or
the use of administrative subpoenas, at the
earliest possible time.
2. Timing of PRP Search
Current EPA policy and SARA encourage beginning a
preliminary PRP search early in the Superfund cleanup process, at
the time of site discovery, regardless of whether a removal or
remedial action is anticipated. However, the baseline PRP search
usually is done after a preliminary assessment (PA) and during
the expanded site inspection (SI). When response actions must
precede completion of the PRP search, the search should continue
in order to support cost recovery or future response actions.
PRP searches are required to be completed not later than the year
in which the site is proposed for the NPL.
Further Information
PRP Search Manual (August 1987), OSWER Directive
9834.6.
3. Community Relations During PRP Search
The Community Relations Coordinator (CRC) interviews
citizens of the affected community to gather information on site
conditions, PRPs, or other data relevant to enforcement. In
these cases, "community relations staff must ensure that this
information is provided as soon as possible to enforcement
staff... Community relations plans for enforcement-lead remedial
action sites should be prepared as soon as possible following the
discussions with the affected community" (Community Relations
Handbook).
Activities to be included in the Community Relations Plan
(CRP) are discussed in the Handbook. In preparing the Plan,
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community relations staff work closely with Regional technical
enforcement staff and the Office of Regional Counsel (ORC).
Before community relations staff can implement the Plan, it must
be approved by the chief official in the Regional Office
responsible for technical enforcement and by the ORC.
Further Information
Community Relations in Superfund: A Handbook (October
1987), OSWER Directive 9230.0-3B.
RECOMMENDAT IONS
* Use a mediator to settle disagreements between EPA staff
or between EPA and DOJ regarding the nature and extent of
community relations activities to be carried out at a
site
* Use a mediator to incorporate community concerns into the
draft CRP at the earliest possible time after discussions
with the community residents
* Use a facilitator to outline government responsibilities
in the Community Relations Plan, especially when many
agencies are involved. If the community is satisfied by
the way EPA addresses its concerns, it will not bring
political and legal challenges against the Agency.
* Use a mediator to address community concerns and convene
meetings when the community is hostile toward the Agency.
* Use trained EPA staff to facilitate public meetings under
normal circumstances
* Encourage RPs to hire a facilitator to identify and
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coordinate PRPs
4. Information Exchange
The exchange of information between EPA and PRPs is crucial
for facilitating settlements. Information exchange should be an
ongoing process of communication. EPA uses information obtained
from PRPs to determine potential liability, to determine the need
for response, and to support the selection of the cleanup remedy.
PRPs use information obtained from EPA to organize among
themselves for cost allocation and to develop a "good faith
offer" to conduct or finance response actions.
(a) Information Requests
EPA may want to issue information requests under Section
104(e) of CERCLA and Section 3007 of RCRA either as part of the
General Notice Letter (see below) or as a separate letter during
the PRP search process. Information commonly requested includes
details concerning waste operations and waste management
practices; the type and amount of substances contributed by each
PRP; the name of other PRPs that contributed substances to the
site; and the PRPs financial status.
(b) Information Release
The Regions are encouraged to release information to PRPs as
soon as reasonably possible and are strongly encouraged to use
the notice letters to release site-specific information. As
stated in the "Interim CERCLA Settlement Policy", release of
information to PRPs should generally be conditioned on a
reciprocal release of information by PRPs, with the exception of
the names of other notice letter recipients or waste-in lists and
volumetric rankings. The Regions should not release information
that might negatively impact any potential litigation and should
shield confidential material. The Agency will generally not
release actual evidentiary material.
Further Information
(1) "Interim CERCLA Settlement Policy", December 5, 1984.
(2) "Timely Initiation of Responsible Party Searches,
Issuance of Notice Letters, and Release of
Information", October 9, 1985.
RECOMMENDATIONS
* Use information request authority to obtain PRP
information early in PRP search
* Include in Information Requests a statement concerning
the joint development of unavailable data
* Use a mediator to act as a conduit for the transfer of
data (such as PRP waste-in lists) between PRPs and EPA
* Use an outside facilitator or a trained EPA facilitator
to coordinate the collection of site-specific data
when numerous sources exist; establish a common base of
facts on which to build the remedial action
* Use a facilitator to help reach agreement between EPA and
PRPs on known facts and the need to obtain further data
* Share information early with PRPs so that holes in the
database can be identified and quick action taken
* Jointly design a strategy with PRPs to supplement
existing data, possibly through joint fact-finding, even
if the PRP search is still underway
* Use a facilitator to help parties jointly agree on the
methods by which to obtain additional data. (For
instance, EPA and PRPs may agree to do further split
sampling and analyses at a portion of the site to
determine groundwater flow and contamination levels.)
* Use an outside fact-finder for scientific or technical
assessments. (For instance, to determine risk, it may be
appropriate to convene representatives from ATSDR, EPA,
PRPs, the States, the site community, the site
contractor, and other relevant parties to design a risk
assessment that provides insight into community and site
worker risk.)
* Encourage PRPs to hire a mediator to assist them in
allocating costs for the RI/FS. If the PRPs agree, non-
binding or binding arbitration would also be appropriate.
* The Regions should base "non-binding preliminary
allocations of responsibility" (NBARs) on consensus
requests from PRPs. EPA should encourage PRPs to reach
their own agreement regarding cost allocation and accept
any consensual (or arbitrated) agreement as a substitute
for the SARA-imposed NBARs which EPA must issue after the
RI/FS is complete.
* Use data mediation to help EPA and other parties explore
sources of disagreement and narrow differences

B. GENERAL NOTICE LETTERS
1. Timing of General Notice
EPA sends a General Notice Letter to PRPs at the earliest
possible time, preferably once the site has been proposed for
inclusion on the NPL. General Notice Letters should be sent to
all parties where there is sufficient evidence to make a
preliminary determination of potential liability under Section
107 of CERCLA.
2. Purpose of General Notice
The purpose of the General Notice letter is to inform PRPs
of their potential liability for future response costs; to begin
or continue information exchange; to discuss activities that EPA
plans to undertake at the site; and to initiate informal
negotiations. In addition, the General Notice informs PRPs about
the possible use of the CERCLA Section 122(e) Special Notice
procedures that trigger a formal negotiation period.
Notification procedures should provide PRPs with sufficient time
to organize and develop a reasonable offer to conduct or finance
the response action.
3. Contents of General Notice
General Notice Letters routinely include information
requests under CERCLA Section 104(e) if not previously issued,
and often include information on other PRPs (i.e. names, volume
and nature of substances contributed, and a ranking by volume of
substances at the site). General Notice letters also request
that PRPs identify a member of their organization to represent
their interests and recommend that PRPs form a steering committee
to represent the group's interests in possible future
negotiations.
Further Information
"Interim Guidance on Notice Letters, Negotiations, and
Information Exchange", OSWER, October 19, 1987.
RECOMMENDATIONS
* Encourage PRPs to use a facilitator to convene a
steering committee to represent PRP interests
in negotiations with EPA. To avoid the appearance of
bias, EPA can pay for the facilitator and add this cost
to response costs sought by EPA from PRPs.
* Include in Notice Letters a section on PRP benefits of
settlement and the costs of not participating. General
Notice Letters should spell out direct incentives for
PRPs that settle and disincentives for those who don't
The tone of the letter should be conciliatory and should
let PRPs know that it is willing to negotiate in good
faith. The letter should not present an ultimatum that
PRPs must negotiate or else EPA will take severe action
* Start informal negotiations as early as possible; include
additional PRPs throughout the negotiation process
* Use a mediator to convene informal negotiations. In the
General Notice, EPA should offer the use of a neutral, to
be jointly chosen, who will assist the parties to mediate
a settlement. The use of a neutral at this point does
not require that an impasse, or a threat of an impasse,
occur. The neutral facilitator or mediator should be
paid by EPA with the cost being added to the response
costs and divided among PRPs in their allocation
agreement
* Include State and other appropriate government
representatives and the public in negotiations as early
as possible to assure future cooperation
* Settle with de minimus PRPs early in negotiation process;
be inclined to accept PRP agreements on de minimis buy-
outs during cost allocations
C. RI/FS SPECIAL NOTICE LETTERS
1. Timing of Special Notice
The Regions should use their discretion to issue the Special
Notice procedures when it determines that a formal period of
negotiation would facilitate an agreement with PRPs and expedite
response action. EPA should send the RI/FS Special Notice Letter
to PRPs no later than 90 days prior -to the scheduled date for
initiating the RI/FS.
2. DOJ Role in RI/FS Negotiations
The Regions should notify the Chief of the Environmental
Enforcement Section of the Department of Justice (DOJ) prior to
issuing Special Notice Letters: (1) when a site is in litigation;
(2) when settlement by consent decree is expected, in which case
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the DOJ must concur before EPA sends out a draft; or (3) when
"the resolution of the matter by an administrative order is
expected to involve a compromise of past or future response costs
and the total response costs will exceed $500,000" (see "Interim
Guidance on Notice Letters, Negotiations, and Information
Exchange"). In this last case, SARA requires that the DOJ
approve the settlement.
3. RI/FS Negotiation Moratorium
Prior to conducting the RI/FS, EPA issues Special Notice
Letters to PRPs, triggering a moratorium on EPA's conducting the
RI/FS. The moratorium provides a period of formal negotiations
where EPA encourages PRPs to conduct or finance response
activities. The negotiation moratorium may last a total of 90
days for the RI/FS if EPA receives a "good faith offer" from PRPs
within the first 60 days of the moratorium. The negotiation
moratorium would conclude after 60 days if the PRPs do not
provide EPA with a "good faith offer."
4. Contents of Special Notice
Special Notice Letters contain, among other things, a copy
of a statement of Work or Work Plan; a draft administrative order
on consent for the RI/FS; and a demand for payment of EPA costs
incurred to date (but only if "Past Costs" are not a part of
settlement negotiations).
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RECOMMENDATIONS
* Pursue all PRPs; don't stop after detecting those with
"deep pockets." The extra up-front negotiations costs
could either be allocated by EPA Headquarters in pilot
projects or split among settling PRPs in regular cases.
Such an issue could become part of settlement
negotiations
* Use a mediator to convene formal negotiation sessions
after the Regions send Special Notice Letters
D. RI/FS NEGOTIATION
It is important to initiate discussions with PRPs early in
the process. While formal negotiations may not begin until after
Special Notice Letters are sent, EPA should encourage early
discussions to educate PRPs about site conditions and exchange
other information pertaining to allocation and related matters.
1. Negotiation Team
The Negotiation Team, routinely comprised of representatives
from the Waste Management Division and the Office of Regional
Counsel, is the primary vehicle for developing settlements.
Other participants may be from the DOJ, OECM, OWPE, and
appropriate State representatives.
The responsibilities of the negotiation team are to:
* ensure that PRP searches, notice, and information exchange
are properly scheduled and completed;
* develop a comprehensive negotiations strategy in advance
of negotiations;
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* develop and share draft settlement documents, including
technical scopes of work, in advance of negotiations;
* conduct negotiations; and
* raise issues to the Regional Administrator, and where
necessary, to the Settlement Decision Committee for
resolution.
The Negotiating Team designee serves as liaison between the
Negotiating Team and Regional Superfund Community Relations
Coordinator (RSCRC). The Negotiating Team designee is
responsible for keeping the RSCRC informed of the negotiation
schedule. The RSCRC is responsible for advising the Negotiating
Team on Superfund Community Relations policy and for managing
community relations activities approved by the Team.
Further Information
"Interim Guidance: Streamlining the CERCLA Settlement
Decision Process", OSWER, February 12, 1987.
2. Negotiation Preparation
The Negotiation Team should be fully prepared for
negotiations with PRPs and should begin with a negotiation
strategy and government proposed settlement documents (e.g. a
draft consent decree or administrative order for RI/FS, as well
as technical support documents). A coordinated negotiation
strategy would enable EPA to be clear about its goals and
conditions for a successful outcome.
The Negotiation Team should prepare its negotiation strategy
around the following:
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* initial positions on major issues with alternative and
bottom-line positions or statements of settlement
objectives;
* negotiation schedule with appropriate deadlines and
interim milestones;
* strategy and schedule for action against PRPs in the
event negotiations are unsuccessful.
The Regions should take responsibility to help PRPs prepare
for negotiations so that they have the time and information to
organize themselves. Settlements have been smoother when EPA has
given early notice to PRPs, shared substantial information
(including draft settlement documents), and assisted in the
formation of PRP steering committees.
RECOMMENDATION
* Use a facilitator to help PRPs, EPA, and other parties
organize among themselves to prepare for negotiations.
(For instance, a facilitator can coordinate a conference
call to establish upcoming meeting agendas or develop the
agenda through separate phone calls to various parties.)
3. Endangerment Assessment
The Regions must perform an endangerment assessment to
support all administrative and judicial enforcement actions under
Section 106 of CERCLA and Section 7003 of RCRA (see "Endangerment
Assessment Guidance"). An endangerment assessment provides the
documentation and justification for the Agency to support its
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claim that an "imminent and substantial endangerment to public
health or welfare or the environment" may exist. The above
guidance document lends information on the content, timing, level
of detail, format, and resources required for the preparation of
endangerment assessments.
If RPs elect to perform the RI/FS, they will, in effect,
develop many or all of the elements in an endangerment assessment
as part of the RI/FS. The Region should review the RI/FS Work
Plan to determine the adequacy of the RPs plans to conduct the
elements of the endangerment assessment.
Further Information
"Endangerment Assessment Guidance", November 22, 1985,
OSWER 9850.0-1)
4. Notice To State For Administrative Order Under
Section 106
Before EPA can issue an Administrative Order under Section
106, it must notify the "affected state" of the Agency's
intention to issue the Order (see "Guidance on the Use and
Issuance of Administrative Orders Under Section 106").
Further Information
"Guidance on the Use and Issuance of Administrative Orders
Under Section 106", OSWER 9833.0).
5. Conference On Administrative Orders Under Section 106
EPA offers parties to whom it issues a unilateral Section
106 Order an opportunity to confer with the Agency (see "Guidance
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on the Use and Issuance of Administrative Orders Under Section
106"). At the conference, EPA provides the Respondent with the
information that serves as a basis for the Order. The Respondent
has the opportunity to ask questions and present its views
through legal counsel or technical advisers. The Agency then
uses the Respondent's comments to alter the Order if appropriate.
RECOMMENDATIONS
* Use a mediator to convene settlement conferences;
* Use a mediator to meet separately with EPA and PRPs to
strategize about the use of confidential information used
during negotiations and to hear concerns that either
party has difficulty expressing to the other
6. Timely Settlements
EPA must use discretion to find the balance between adhering
to firm schedules and being flexible with deadlines. The chances
for successful negotiations can be dramatically affected by
setting deadlines too tightly, thus destroying the willingness of
PRPs to attempt to settle. On the other hand, prolonged and
inconclusive negotiations can seriously delay response actions at
a site. Deadlines are often effective in forcing issues to
resolution. Negotiations should only be extended when clear
"progress" is made and the outcome for settlement is likely and
imminent. Delays in EPA negotiation decisions in response to PRP
settlement offers often affect the willingness of PRPs to settle
and always impair the credibility of the Negotiating Team. The
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Regions must establish guidance for bringing issues to closure so
that excessive delay does not occur (see "Interim Guidance:
Streamlining the CERCLA Settlement Decision Process").
EPA uses its CERCLA granted authority to explore mixed
funding settlements, RI/FS Past Costs, and may offer Covenents
Not to Sue (in special circumstances) to encourage PRP
settlements.
7. Management Review of Settlement Decisions
Administrative settlements for RI/FSs are fully the Regional
Administrator's responsibility. Concurrence from the Office of
Solid Waste and Emergency Response (OSWER) and the Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring (OECM) continues to be
required on RD/RA settlements and for major issues such as mixed
funding, de minimis settlements, and deferred payment schemes,
all of which may arise during RI/FS negotiations.
The Settlement Decision Committee (SDC) has been created in
Headquarters to provide timely action on issues which require
Headquarters review. Its primary responsibility is to coordinate
decisions on policy issues raised by Regions.
The Assistant Administrator Review Team provides overall
policy direction on settlement concepts, but will also be
available to resolve major policy issues specific to sites where
necessary, as determined by the SDC. The Chair of the Assistant
Administrator (AA) Review Team, the AA-OSWER, must approve
extensions of negotiations beyond the 30 day authority granted to
Regional Administrators.
107
RECOMMENDATIONS
* Establish a Hotline for quick decisions on PRP settlement
offers
* Establish a computer-based inventory of precedent" to
maintain Regional consistency while ensuring flexibility
* Have facilitator walk agreement through Agency for
approval
8. Negotiation Extension
If no agreement is reached, the Negotiation Team may seek an
additional 30-day extension to the 90-day moratorium from the
Regional Administrator under limited circumstances. To extend
negotiations beyond the additional 30 days granted by Regional
Administrators (RAs), RAs must make a special request in writing
through the Director-OWPE to the AA-OSWER. These special
requests must include the length of extension requested; the
status of negotiations including resolved and unresolved issues;
justification for extension; and actions to be taken in the event
that negotiations are unsuccessful.
RECOMMENDATIONS
* Use a mediator to help the Regional Administrator and
Negotiation Team prepare requests for special
extensions to RI/FS negotiations moratorium
* Use a mediator at the end of an unsuccessful negotiation
to work with Regional Administrators, PRPs, and
Negotiation Teams to reach consensus about the problems
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creating impasse, whether settlement is "likely and
imminent," and whether an extension to negotiations
should be sought
* Use a mediator to help negotiators fulfill the
requirements of the special extension request that must
go to the Assistant Administrator, OSWER
9. Conclusion of Negotiations
(a) Successful Negotiations
If negotiations are successful, EPA and the PRPs will sign a
consent order or consent decree. Consent orders and consent
decrees will contain elements established as part of the PRPs
"Good Faith Offer" for the RI/FS as stipulated in the "Guidance
on Notice Letters, Negotiations, and Information Exchange" cited
earlier. In addition, these agreements may contain a PRP
commitment to conduct an RI/FS consistent with the Scope of Work
and to reimburse EPA for RI/FS oversight.
(1) EPA Compliance Monitoring of Consent Orders
and Consent Decrees
After a consent order or consent decree is signed, EPA
conducts compliance monitoring at the sites to ensure that RPs
comply with the terms of the documents. If the RP does not
comply, the Agency's first recourse is normally to resolve the
non-compliance informally. If after 30 days, the issue is not
resolved, the Agency seeks collection of stipulated penalties
(see page ). If the issue is still unresolved, the Agency must
decide whether to refer the case to the DOJ for filing of a suit
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to force compliance or whether to undertake Fund-financed cleanup
and file suit for cost recovery plus statutory penalties for
compliance failure. Negotiations may be resumed at any point
after referral and filing of a Section 106 action.
The Regions perform follow-up compliance determinations for
compliance order schedules or conditions in the effective consent
or unilateral order. The Regions must provide a written report
on non-compliance no later than 30 days after the specified
compliance date has passed. The Regional Program Office must
choose an appropriate enforcement response for non-compliance
with the administrative order within two weeks after making the
non-compliance determination.
RECOMIENDATIONS
* Use a mediator to convene responsible parties (RPs) and
EPA at meetings that are part of the Agency compliance
monitoring at the site to ensure that RPs comply with the
terms of consent orders and consent decrees; especially
effective when there are a large number of RPs.
(2) Community Relations Under Consent Orders
or Consent Decrees
Formal public comment periods for proposed administrative
orders on consent are not required by law or regulation to
initiate the RI/FS. However, if "RI/FS Past Costs" are included
in the settlement, CERCLA Section 122 (i) requires that EPA issue
a public notice. In addition, the Region may require formal
public comment periods for consent orders on a site-specific
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basis. "The execution of a proposed consent decree by RPs and
the government is followed by a public comment period of at least
30 days. The court may also hold a hearing during this time,
either in response to public comments or on its own accord.
After a judge approves the consent decree (which may have been
modified on the basis of comments), the consent decree is made
final and the remedial plan is implemented" (Community Relations
Handbook).
a) Community Relations Plan. A complete
Community Relations Plan must be developed and approved before
remedial investigation field activities begin (NCP section
300.687(c); Superfund Community Relations policy 1983). In all
cases, community relations staff must coordinate their activities
with Technical Enforcement, legal staff, and the Remedial Project
Manager to ensure that any releases of information are reviewed
and approved in advance.
The Community Relations Handbook describes the conditions
under which there will be constraints on the scope of community
relations activities, in particular when the site has been
referred to the DOJ for litigation. Community relations
activities are usually assumed by EPA at all NPL sites, although
certain responsibilities may be delegated to PRPs when they agree
to perform the cleanup. In some instances, the Agency may find
it appropriate for RPs to participate in aspects of the community
relations plan jointly with the EPA. If community relations
staff must modify an existing plan, it must be approved by
technical enforcement and ORC and, once a case has been referred,
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by the DOJ.
RECOMMENDATIONS
* Use a facilitator to divide the roles and
responsibilities among RPs and EPA when RPs will
participate in aspects of the community relations plan
(CRP) jointly with EPA; this may be especially helpful
after the CRP is developed; include the public in such
meetings when it would benefit the cleanup effort or if
deemed appropriate
* Use a mediator to settle differences between EPA, the
community, and PRPs when PRPs want to participate in
aspects of CRP jointly with EPA
b) RI/FS Public Comment. Once the enforcement
RI/FS is completed, it must be made available for public review
and comment in accordance with procedures that apply to Fund-lead
sites (Community Relations Handbook). A Negotiations Decision
Document (NDD) is prepared at the close of the comment period and
serves as a basis for EPA to determine the remedy to be sought by
RPs.
RECOMMENDATIONS
* Include key community and State representatives in small
discussions with EPA and PRPs before public review and
comment of RI/FS
* Use a facilitator to moderate public meetings that
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discuss the completed RI/FS and provide the community an
opportunity for meaningful input
* Use a facilitator to moderate public review and comment
of RI/FS of negotiated settlement documents (i.e.
proposed consent order or consent decree)
* Use a mediator to convene key state and community
representatives, PRPs, and EPA prior to 30-day public
comment period for RI/FS negotiated settlement documents
(i.e. consent order and consent decree)
(b) Conclusion of Unsuccessful Negotiation
Absent further extension of negotiations, the Regions are
expected to move forward with either a unilateral administrative
order demanding that RPs take action; judicial referral, whereby
DOJ files a complaint in federal district court against the RPs -
if one previously has not been filed; or Fund-financed action and
cost recovery. In the latter instance, unless RPs agree
willingly to pay cost recovery claims, EPA asks the DOJ to file a
civil action against the RPs pursuant to CERCLA Section 107.
However, such cost recovery efforts generally are conducted after
a Fund-financed response is completed. "Guidance on the Use and
Issuance of Administrative Orders Under Section 106" explains the
conditions under which the Regions may want to issue an
administrative order and when it may be more appropriate to
pursue a judicial or Fund-financed remedy.
(a) Judicial Referral
As stated in the "Guidance on the Use and Issuance of
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Administrative Orders," enforcement personnel should "strongly
consider the judicial course of action if (1) RPs have violated
provisions in several environmental statutes; (2) the opportunity
for public comment on the terms of the settlement agreement
warrants the use of a judicial consent decree...; and (3) there
is need for long term court oversight of a settlement
agreement..."
The decision to pursue judicial referral rests with the
Regional Program Office, in consultation with the Regional
Counsel. EPA will refer a case to the DOJ if " a significant
violation or an imminent hazard has been discovered, or a site
requiring CERCLA action is identified," and if the administrative
enforcement process is deemed to be inadequate or inappropriate
to resolve the dispute (RCRA/CERCLA Case Management Handbook,
Aug. 1984). EPA does not normally refer a case until
administrative remedies have been "completed, abandoned, or
determined to be fruitless or unnecessary." Litigation should
also be considered when it is necessary to clarify the law, to
set a precedent, and to establish credibility.
1. Community Relations Under DOJ Referral
Community relations staff may need to revise the Community
Relations Plan if the case is referred to the DOJ for litigation.
If this happens, CR staff work with the DOJ through the ORC to
revise the plan for final DOJ approval.
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CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that ADR can offer a wider range of'
methods by which EPA can resolve, or avoid, disputes. ADR can
help achieve better results than traditional dispute resolution
because it provides a means to reach not only tangible goals of
lower overall transaction costs, quicker time for cleanup, and
more PRP settlements, but also those pertaining to the emotional
well-being of participants, such as satisfaction with the process
and outcome, future relationships, and perceived safety from
risk. If including more parties increases the time and cost of
cleanup, Superfund goals need to be reassessed. Does EPA have
timelines for cost considerations or because of public health and
safety? Would the public be as concerned with quick cleanup if
they were part of the decisions and experienced the reasons for
delay? Probably not.
ADR is also a better process because it is more democratic.
The Superfund program currently allows for only limited
participation. Congress, through the CERCLA amendments, skews
the enforcement process toward PRP participation and away from
inclusion of the site community, as well as state and local
governments.
The PRPs, who fuel the Superfund, can either perform the
cleanup for which EPA chooses the remedy or pay EPA to conduct
the cleanup and have a little voice in where the money goes.
States currently have little input in how sites within their own
borders are cleaned up. The local site community, however, has
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virtually no opportunity to affect decisions besides the weak,
and often ineffectual, review and comment provision granted by
CERCLA. Therefore, they still do not have control over a major
part of their lives, the safety of a nearby hazardous waste site.
EPA can move in two directions - toward no participation or
full participation. The one extreme void of participation from
parties other than EPA could come about by Congress imposing a
tax on chemical companies to supply a huge fund for EPA to clean
up sites as the Agency saw fit. PRPs would have no say in how
EPA used the money and the states, local government, and
community would also have no input in the extent of cleanup.
Full participation, the option I advocate, would provide
PRPs a more reasonable opportunity than they now have to choose
between cleaning up the site or having greater input in how the
government used its money for cleanup. Similarly, the site
community would have more control over events that shape the
daily lives of its citizens. They would be given equal
bargaining status during all major phases of negotiation. State
and local government participation would be equal that of the
public.
In this scenario, EPA would convene all interests and act
more as a conciliator than a mandator, although it would still
retain ultimate responsibility for decisions. EPA, therefore,
would shift itself from a position of adversary to the PRPs to
one in the middle between two polar interests represented by PRPs
and the public.
I think that EPA should provide an opportunity for all
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"legitimately interested" parties to participate in decisions to
cleanup Superfund sites. The site communities were the main
force behind public awareness of hazardous wastes and the
resultant Superfund legislation. Why exclude them from decisions
on how to use this money for cleanup? Although CERCLA amendments
indicate that Congress intends EPA to move in this direction, I
don't believe that anyone yet has provided the vision for
"meaningful participation." I hope this thesis moves us closer
to this vision.
Headquarters' efforts to incorporate ADR into Superfund
enforcement have thus far been passive. The next year will tell
whether the Agency is serious about its commitment to test ADR's
application to Superfund or whether they have no intentions of
pulling for its success. Opportunities certainly exist. This is
not to say that there are no dedicated ADR advocates within the
Agency. However, the inertia that must be overcome is great.
It would be a shame for the Agency to languish in its old
ways as another administrative deadline (for RI/FSs and RD/RAs)
passes, especially since there is a choice for something to
assist them in reaching these goals.
It will take ADR experts outside the Agency to convince the
key officials in Headquarters to commit to facilitated dialogues,
trainings, pilot projects, and protocols. This will take a great
deal of focused energy to work out the details. However, the
potential benefits will be well worth the effort. I am
absolutely convinced that if the Agency wants to succeed at using
ADR in Superfund, it can do so. Now, only time will tell.
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APPENDIX
Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution
The following ADR methods may prove useful in the resolution
of enforcement actions:
NEUTRALS
Facilitator
A facilitator:
(1) helps the parties focus on collective tasks, offering
only process suggestions;
(2) helps to ensure that all participants have a chance to
be heard;
(3) arranges meeting times and places;
(4) assists in developing an agenda; and
(5) holds parties to an agreed upon schedule.
A facilitator usually keeps a visible record of what the
participants say by writing notes on large sheets of newsprint in
full view of the group. Such a "group memory" helps keep track
of the proceedings, reduces information overload, and permits
more sophisticated problem-solving.
Mediator
A mediator offers the same process management ability as a
facilitator, but also:
(1) identifies all relevant parties and ensures that key
participants are included;
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(2) meets separately with the disputants to hear more about
their concerns and aspirations;
(3) suggests "trades" or "packages" that meet the needs of
all parties;
(4) serves as message carrier between or among the
disputants;
(5) helps to draft the language of an agreement;
(6) assists in the management of joint fact-finding when
highly technical matters are involved; and
(7) helps participants hold each other to their commitments,
usually by playing a monitoring role on behalf of the
group as a whole.
Mediation can be "passive" or "active". Passive mediation
focuses more on communication and less on the invention of
options for mutual gain. A passive mediator will urge the
parties to formulate their own agreements and will meet
separately with them only when all else has failed. A passive
mediator would not find it necessary to have specialized
knowledge about the substance of a dispute, and may even find
that having such knowledge could cause a bias.
Conversely, an active mediator would be expected to have
substantive knowledge about the content of a dispute that would
enable him or her to be more effective in suggesting the terms of
possible agreements. An active mediator might call in expert
consultants to inform the group about various technical issues.
An active mediator will also caucus frequently with the separate
parties, and might even do so before meeting with the group as a
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whole.
Arbitrator
Arbitration involves a hearing before a neutral party who
usually has subject matter expertise. The parties select the
arbitrator, the procedures to be followed; and the issues to be
heard. Arbitration is procedurally less formal than a trial and
can be binding or nonbinding. Non-binding arbitration does not
give the final say to the intermediary. This distinguishes it
from binding arbitration in which the parties agree ahead of time
to abide by the final decision of a private "judge".
[Some of this definition was taken from EPA guidance: "Settlement
of Enforcement Actions Using Alternative Dispute Resolution
Techniques," OSWER, October 2, 1985.]
Mini-trial
A procedure used frequently in non-binding arbitration is a
"mini-trial". This is not a trial in the conventional sense, but
rather a voluntary, confidential, non-binding presentation of
views by all sides in a dispute. It has proven successful in
many situations, including those requiring expert analysis of
highly technical issues. The key elements of the mini-trial are:
(1) a short period of pre-trial preparation;
(2) a jointly selected non-partisan advisor to hear
procedurally-informal summary presentations of each
party's "best case" by a lawyer or expert;
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(3) opportunity for rebuttal along with questions concerning
the presentation; and
(4) an opportunity to negotiate a settlement. If the
parties fail to reach agreement, the advisor offers an
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the parties'
positions.
Fact-finding
Fact-finding involves the investigation by a neutral with
specialized subject matter expertise of issues the parties chosen
by the parties. The neutral is selected by the disputants. The
process is voluntary and may be binding or non-binding. If the
parties agree, the material presented by the parties to the fact-
finder may be admissible in a subsequent hearing. The procedures
are informal because fact-finding is an investigatory process;
the object is to narrow factual or technical issues in dispute.
Fact-finding usually results in a report or testimony.
[Much of this definition was taken from EPA guidance: "Settlement
of Enforcement Actions Using Alternative Dispute Resolution
Techniques," OSWER, October 2, 1985.1
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